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HE GUARDIAN OF financial disclosure is the independent
accountant. Even before the Depression-era federal securities laws
mandated audited financial statements, the accounting profession
provided its important attest function to issuers who wished to signal
their greater trustworthiness by having their financial statements
certified as complying with generally-accepted accounting principles.
Upon their enactment, the federal securities laws made this formerly
isolated voluntary practice a requirement for public companies.1 Thus,
the accountants became the most pervasive of all the gatekeepers that the
federal securities laws socialized into their mission of protecting
investors.2
This chapter explores the extent to which the highly-concentrated
structure of the accounting profession contributes to its failure to serve
* Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University. The author is grateful for the helpful
suggestions of Professors William Bratton, Deborah DeMott, Barak Richman, and Randall
Thomas and the participants of the Reflections on the Reform of Corporate Disclosure and
Accounting Rules Conference at Tilburg University April 2004. The author has benefitted
immensely by research assistance of Ms Maria Hahan, Christopher Fazekas and Raegan
Watchman.
1 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25)(26); § 13(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2).
2 Gatekeeper responsibilities are imposed selectively in other provisions of the securities
laws. For example, underwriters and directors are impressed into service through their
obligations to undertake a reasonable investigation in connection with registered public
offerings. See Securities Act § 11(a)(2)(5) & (b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(2)(5) and (b)(3).
Supervisors of brokers have a duty to supervise that imposes gatekeeper-like responsibilities
in appropriate settings. See Securities Exchange Act § 15(b)(4)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (b)(4)(E).
And the control person liability provisions, § 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o, and §
20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t, can have this effect, particularly when read to
require the maintenance of compliance systems. See generally Cox et al. (2004: 748–50) for a
review of cases where the ‘good faith’ defense requirement mandates more than the absence
of knowledge.
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the public interest by not being a diligent and independent gatekeeper of
financial reporting. In Part I, data is presented that documents that the
accounting industry is dominated by a few major firms so that it is
correctly viewed as an oligopoly. The potential adverse effects of an
oligopoly are described in Part II where we also review the conditions
that enable firms within a highly-concentrated industry to misbehave as
members of a cartel. As will be seen, industry concentration alone does
not inevitably lead to adverse social welfare effects. Part III reviews the
rising importance of consulting revenues to the dominant accounting
firms and in Part IV the transformation of accounting firms into
consulting firms is linked to the accountants being members of an
oligopoly. Structure, not greed alone, is identified as an important cause
of the accounting industry transforming itself from a profession to a
business. The point developed in this chapter is that even though
accountants compete aggressively with one another for audit clients, on
closer examination we unravel just how the accounting firms pursue
parallel conduct to maximize their collective wealth. Specifically, we find
that during the past two decades a variety of forces drove the major
accounting firms to place greater emphasis on their being providers of
non-audit services to their audit clients and that the cartel-like structure
allows them to pursue this course collectively.
Part IV also describes the negative social welfare that can arise when
non-audit services are provided by auditors to their audit clients. It is this
aspect of the auditors’ business plan that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(the Act)3 directs several of its key provisions that are examined in Part V.
However, in Part VI we find some disturbing evidence that with regard to
auditor behaviour, little has changed since the enactment of SarbanesOxley so that the harmful effects of auditors vending non-audit services
to their clients continues today at levels that pose the same threat to their
independence. Part VII offers reforms that are necessary to assure that the
industry competes on the basis of quality and not more harmful terrain.
Part VIII concludes.

I . A FE W F I S H I N A VE RY L A R GE P O N D

There can be little doubt that structurally the accounting industry is an
oligopoly. Once we could aptly describe the US accounting industry
by referring to the ‘Big Eight.’ Life, however, is never static. As a
consequence of a flurry of mega-mergers between 1987–98—mergers that
sometimes crossed international borders4—the Big Eight became the Big
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, PL 107-204 (30 July 2002).
For example, US-based Peat Marwick Mithchell, a member of the Big Eight, merged with a
non-Big Eight firm, KMG Main Hurdman, an affiliate of European-based Klynveld Main
Goerdeler, to form KPMG.
3
4
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Five. Following the criminal conviction and consequent disappearance of
Big Five member Arthur Andersen, we now can refer to the industry as
the ‘The Final Four.’ Legitimate external forces drove the Big Eight to
become participants in a wave of consolidations within their already
heavily-concentrated industry. As clients became more international,
their auditors needed to become more global.5 With the rise of expensive
data processing, there was the need for the accounting firms to achieve
critical economies of scale.6 Having more auditors married to an
expensive infrastructure was a wise financial strategy especially if it also
meant they would bring to the acquiring firm their clients as well.
By gaining auditors and clients, the surviving firm achieved important
economies of scale that could support the expensive technology that
became an integral part of the work of the industry. And, as audit clients
became more specialized, global, and complex, there was the need on the
part of the accounting firms to stay abreast with their audit clients, i.e.,
the auditing firm also had to acquire pockets of specialization, be global
in its operations, and have an infrastructure that could address the
complexities of their clients’ businesses and systems. Finally, growth and
consolidation were strategies to maintain market share of the surviving
firms (GAO 2003a: 12–15).
In a masterpiece of understatement, a recent GAO study of the
accounting industry observes (ibid.: 16):
[T]he large public company audit market is a tight oligopoly. … In the large
public company audit market, the Big 4 now audit over 97 percent of all public companies with sales over $250 million, and other firms face significant
barriers to entry into the market. … When comparing the top 25 firms on the
basis of total revenues, partners, and staff resources, the Big 4 do not have any
smaller-firm competitors … 7

Concentration within public accounting is evident from a variety of
metrics. For example, the concentration for audit services within the
industry is reflected by the fact that 2002 revenues of the fourth largest
firm, KPMG, were eight times greater than those of the fifth largest firm,
Grant Thornton and that KPMG had five times as many staff members as
Grant Thornton (ibid.: 17, table 1). Even more dramatic is that the total

6 Thomas, Schwab and Hansen (2001) describe the growth of accounting firms as being
driven by the demands of their audit clients, and not by a quest to leverage their human
capital; audit firm clients’ are constantly increasing in size/complexity and becoming more
international.
6 Yardley et al. (1992: 163) speculate that economies of scale may be a influence in the market
for very large audit clients.
7 The high concentration is not limited to the United States. 90% of the companies listed in
the Netherlands, and 80% of those listed in Japan are audit clients of a Big Four firm (ibid.: 18).
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2002 audit revenues of KPMG were 60 per cent greater than the total
revenues of the next 21 largest firms (ibid.).8
From another perspective, consider the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index
(HHI)—a metric commonly used by the US Department of Justice to
assess the potentially anti-competitive effects of concentration within an
industry. In 1998, the year of the last great merger within the
industry—the combination of PriceWaterhouse with Coopers Lybrand—
the HHI score for the accounting industry was more than 10 per cent
above the level normally associated with a score that is likely to permit
industry participants to maintain prices above competitive periods for
significant periods of time (ibid.: 19, Fig. 3). Following the demise of
Arthur Andersen in 2002, the HHI increased to more than 40 per cent
above this anti-competitive warning level (ibid.).
Although it may seem improbable, the provision of audit services is
even more concentrated than described above. Within certain industries,
an individual accounting firm’s expertise enables it to be a virtual
monopolist because it enjoys the dominant body of expertise for audits
within that industry. Stated differently, public companies seeking an
auditor gravitate toward the audit firm they understand possesses
industry-specific expertise. As a consequence, one or two accounting
firms perform a substantial amount of the audits within certain key
industry sectors. For example, 76.4 per cent of total assets of the
petroleum and coal products industry were audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers, and nearly 60 per cent of the assets of non-depositary
institutions were audited by KPMG. In 1997, before the demise of Arthur
Andersen, 32.9 per cent and 31.6 per cent of total assets within the general
building contractors industry were audited by Ernst & Young and Arthur
Andersen, respectively; following the 2002 demise of Arthur Andersen,
Ernst & Young’s percentage rose to 60.7 per cent (ibid.: 28–9, Fig. 7). 9
The cause for such industry concentration cannot all be placed solely at
the door of the auditors’ clients. To be sure, large multinational firms can
be expected to seek auditors of comparable geographical breadth and
staffing relative to their audit competitors. But this should only explain a
small amount of the forces causing accounting firms to be so highly
concentrated in their provision of audit services. One can question
skeptically what percentage of the 17,000 public companies and nearly
7000 mutual funds that file reports with the SEC for which each registrant
must have financial statements certified by a public accountant are either
so global or so extensive that they require the services of a Big Four
8 In 2002 KPMG had total audit revenues of $2.016 billion and the next 21 firms combined
audit revenues were $1.231 billion (ibid.).
9 We also note a large number of industries in which two of the Big Four dominated in 2002
with the two firms in combination having a total market share in terms of assets audited in
excess of 70% (ibid.: App. IV, Figs. 13–14).
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accounting firm. Big audit clients do not inherently call for their audits to
be performed by members of an oligopoly.

I I . A T H E O R E T I C A L F R A M E W O R K FO R U N D E R S TA N D I N G A N D
H E A L I N G T H E A C C O U N T I N G I N D U S T RY

Concentration within any industry is rife with the possibilities of
collusion since collusion is more likely to be achieved, and successfully
maintained, when a few members of an industry control the bulk of the
goods produced than when production is dependent upon hundreds of
producer firms. When an industry’s production is dominated by a few
firms, it is more likely that an agreement by three or four of them
regarding price or production of a product will affect the products supply
and its price since collectively they represent a dominant share of the
market. Their actions in turn make it more likely that other producers will
understand that their profits will increase by following the pricing or
supply decisions of the colluding members. In this manner, the rising tide
of prices lifts all industry-members boats. On the other hand, when there
are numerous producers within an industry, agreement among enough of
its participants to affect the market is very difficult to achieve. And, even
if an agreement were reached, individual members are likely to defect
from its terms thereby robbing the agreement of its intended effects.
Moreover, an agreement among numerous industry members is far more
likely to be detected by antitrust enforcers. Consequently, collusion is
more likely to be successful within concentrated industries than those
that are competitively structured. Industry concentration, therefore,
always raises concerns that there will be either overt collusion or
conscious parallel behaviour that yields the same effects as an agreement.
The adverse social welfare of collusive behaviour is well understood.
Firms that are permitted to coordinate on price or production will see it is
in their interest to do so. This strategy enables colluding firms to increase
their collective profits at the expense of consumer welfare. Simply stated,
an industry does best if its members act collectively to mimic the practices
that would be engaged in by a monopolist. When an industry’s market
structure is that of an oligopoly, the power of an individual firm to
increase its profits by changing the price of its product, or even by
altering the quantity and quality of the goods or services it produces,
depends on the actions of its competitors. Thus, pricing strategies within
an oligopoly frequently reflect a good deal of interdependence among
rivals within the industry.10
Despite the potential rewards of acting in parallel with industry
10

See Areeda and Hovenkamp (2003: § 1429 at 207).
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members, the oligopolist faces the ongoing dilemma whether to act
individually or collectively. Each firm has an incentive to obtain gains by
undercutting its rivals but at the same time coordinated action by
industry members holds the promise of monopoly-like rewards.11 If the
oligopolist decides to compete by deviating from a prevailing industry
price or production level, the benefits of pursing such an individualistic
course might prove fleeting and ultimately costly. By undercutting the
price of others, the oligopolist seeks to increase its market share and/or
its profits. But its success in doing so depends on the reaction of its rivals.
Rivals who do not match the ‘cheating’ firm’s lower price do so at their
peril of ceding market share to the cheating rival. Rivals may, however,
choose to match the pricing strategy of the cheating rival. If they do, then
the revenues and profits of all industry members decline, so that the
deviation from the earlier collective price results in benefits to consumers,
not the oligopolists. In this case, cheating hurts not just the cheater, but its
co-oligopolists. On the other hand, non-cheating rivals may decide that
they all suffer if each meets the lower price of the cheater. They may
conclude that the cheater will gain only a small amount of market share
by its conduct (e.g., the cheating firm lacks the capacity to satiate much of
the market’s demand) so that their profits are likely to be larger by
maintaining their present prices than if the rivals lowered their price to
that of the cheating firm. The market share they concede to the cheater by
not matching its strategy may not be so significant as to cause the
noncheating firms to reduce the price of their product with the effect of
lowering its overall profits by a greater amount than if it maintained its
existing pricing strategy. The risks facing a firm that adheres to the earlier
collusive price is endemic to a cartel. A firm can well see that holding to
the earlier collusive practices is better for everyone.
Not all oligopolies misbehave by consciously parallel pricing or output
decisions. In his now classic article, Professor George Stigler explains
why not all oligopolies misbehave vis-a-vis consumer welfare (1964). His
article isolates conditions that are necessary for a cartel to function
effectively in ways similar to that of a monopoly: firms must be able to
identify the terms of their coordination, they must be able to detect
deviations, and once finding a deviation they must be able to punish
those that deviate from the collusive strategy supported by the others
(ibid.: _).12 Stigler’s theory provides useful mileposts by which to gauge
the behaviour of the accounting industry.
11 This occurs even if greater production or sales lowers the product’s price the defecting
firm does not absorb the full cost of this lower price. See Hovenkamp (1994: § 4.1a at 143).
12 Professor Hovenkamp (ibid.: § 4.1 at 141) adds to this list three other conditions that
appear assumed by Stigler. Hovenkamp specifies (1) that the relevant cartelized product
or service market must enjoy sufficiently high barriers to entry that prevent newcomers
from undermining the cartel’s pricing or production decisions; (2) that collectively the
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A non-critical view of the accounting industry indicates that the
accounting industry has not behaved as an oligopoly by following
socially harmful parallel conduct. Stated within Stigler’s three factors
there are reasons to conclude that none of these three conditions are
present within the accounting industry. That is, the accounting firms do
not misbehave as an oligopoly because they (1) lack a standardized
commodity for which they can provide a coordinated price; (2) there is an
inability to detect deviations from the agreed upon price; and (3) the
industry lacks any means to punish cheating firms. First, historically,
accounting firms have not been price gougers; indeed, their rates over the
past two decades have not increased significantly. A leading study of
auditor fees found that audit fees declined as a function of client assets (a
comparison made to capture possible rising complexity and scope of the
audit engagement) (Invancevich and Zardkoohi 2000).13 Two, clients
appear satisfied with the fees of their auditors, believing that whatever
fee increases have occurred in the past decade have been the result of
externalities such as increased regulation and litigation-based concerns.14
Indeed, the complaint in the post-Enron era is that in the years leading up
to the recent spate of accounting scandals audit clients too frequently
retarded increases in audit fees sought by the auditors and which
hindsight suggests would have been wise investments.15 Only in postSarbanes-Oxley years have we seen significant increases in audit fees and
much of this can be attributed to additional compliance costs imposed by
the Act as well as accounting firms responding to rising liability costs.16
participating cartel members produce a sufficiently large share of the market so that
non-member’s production cannot undermine the decisions of the cartel (this condition can
also be satisfied if something discourages the non-members from expanding their
production); and (3) that they must be able to carry out their manipulation of production or
price without detection by the government or other outsiders.
13 Menon-and Williams (2001) provide a sample of actual fees from 1989 through 1996, and
show a decline of $3.4 to $2.8 million, adjusted for inflation.
14 GAO (2003b: 10–12) states that 93% of 158 respondents reported an increase in fees, but
only one-half believed consolidation within the industry was responsible.
15 Estimates of the financial fraud uncovered in the peak years of 2001 and 2002 are difficult
to calculate. The bubble market’s collapse removed approximately $8.5 trillion in market
value for publicly-traded securities (Kelly 2002). If one believed only 1% of the market decline
was attributable to financial reporting problems, this would equal $85 Billion. This would
appear quite conservative for what we witnessed in 2001–2 since the market losses during the
preceding boom years—when there were fewer large financial collapses—are estimated to be
about the same. McNamee et al. (2000) estimate losses attributable to accounting failures
between 1993–2000 of at least $88 billion. All this resonates with an observation by a former
SEC chairman (Hills 2002) who has served on many audit committees that audit committees
too frequently saw as their task retarding any increase in audit fees rather than authorizing
appropriate sums be paid to the auditors to assure a high quality audit.
16 Salomon and Bryan-Low (2004) report that audit fees are estimated to rise by as much as
30% for 2004. A study of audit fees paid by 461 of the Fortune 500 firms found an average
increase of 16% from 2002 to 2003 compared with an average increase of 22% for firms outside
the Fortune 500 (Glass Lewis & Co. 2004). The greater percentage increase reported in 2004 as
compared with 2003 increases reflects the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley’s increased reporting
requirements.
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A third consideration arises from the difficulty firms would face in
reaching an agreement regarding the price to charge for their service or
detecting a deviation from the agreed upon price. Information is a key
feature of Stigler’s formula for an effective cartel since this is how
deviations are detected. He predicts that ‘collusion will always be more
effective against buyers who report correctly and fully the prices
tendered to them’ (1964: 48). This condition of the model has implications
for the accounting industry: the auditor’s clients report in their annual
filings with the SEC the sums paid to their auditors.17 Such reporting
arguably makes detection of cheating more likely and invites responses
from competitors eager to meet the deviation by the cheating firm.
However, antitrust theory informs us that, if the significant buyers of the
vended product change their identity or otherwise the cost of the vended
product or services is masked, collusion will be more difficult and
cheating more prevalent (ibid.). This observation has relevance for the
accounting industry; even though the client base of individual auditing
firms is very stable (suggesting a lack of successful competition we would
expect to find associated with the cartel-like behaviour), the services
accountants provide to each client are tailored to that client’s business
and systems. Auditors do not in fact provide a uniform service but one
that varies on a firm-by-firm basis. Since what they vend is not a
commodity, their industry is rife with opportunities for a good deal of
deviation with respect to pricing practices and even quantity and quality
of services provided.18 Stated differently, audit services are not a single
commodity that lends itself to discrete market responses by an auditor’s
rivals. By not being commoditized, audit services are not amenable to
tacit agreement as to its pricing, and departures from any understood
price or quality would be difficult to detect. Thus, if harmful collusion is
to occur, it must occur in some other area than the price and quality of the
service provided since to be so focused is to premise the cartel’s wealth on
nondiscernible metrics.
A final consideration is that there does not appears to be any effective
means for the industry to discipline or otherwise punish a cheating
See Item 14 of SEC Form 10-K.
Areeda and Hovencamp (2003: § 1429c at 209) describe oligopolists as more likely to
compete via sales promotions or product variations which are not easily imitated and can
sometimes be difficult for competitors to respond promptly to so that the deviating member
reaps a strong first mover advantage. Similarly, any differences in preferences among buyers
that give rise to differences in the product or service purchased ‘complicates the process of
observation, coordination, or retaliation’ (ibid.: 211). It is difficult to determine to what extent
the quality of services provided by an auditor varies across its audit clients. At the same time,
it is equally problematic to suggest that a particular audit firm provides a higher quality of
audit services than does its rivals. Eisenberg and Macey (2004) study earnings restatements
and find that when factors are controlled for such variables as client size, time, and industry,
there was no evidence of more frequent earnings restatements for companies audited by
Arthur Andersen than by its rivals.
17
18
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member. Even though—until the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley—the
industry maintained exclusive powers to discipline its members, there is
no evidence that this power was ever used against a Big Eight or Big Five
accounting firm. Moreover, the stability of their client base and steady
growth in their revenues belies that members engaged in any meaningful
sanctions of cheating rivals. After the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the chief
role in disciplining accounting firms is lodged in the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as well as the SEC, each of which
is autonomous from the industry.19
Consistent with the above is evidence that auditors have long been
sensitive to price competition. After the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants removed its ban on bidding for audits in 1972,
competition among major accounting firms has been ‘intense and
vicious.’20 Moreover, this could explain the relative stability of the
auditor’s stable of clients, namely that auditors price their services to
keep the client from defecting to a competitor. As we will see in Part III,
there are possibly more ominous explanations for the auditors’ ability to
retain their respective clients for years and even decades. Price
competition may well have contributed to the woeful poor performance
of accountants to detect a host of financial frauds at the close of the last
decade as well as the continuing oligopolistic structure of the industry.
Absent price competition, monopoly-like profits garnered by the large
accounting firms may well have either attracted new entrants or caused
clients to seek lower-priced smaller accounting firms. But new entrants,
and even existing smaller accounting firms, would confront serious
barriers to entry, such as significant capital investment and reputational
requirements, that must be overcome to serve large audit clients.
Particularly important is evidence that a foremost consideration of firms
opting to have their audits carried out by a Big Eight-Five-Four
accounting firm is the reputational benefits they receive by signaling to
investors their relatively higher quality by choosing a major auditing
firm. That is, firms opt for a major accounting firm not so much because
of economies that are garnered with respect to their audits, but rather to

19 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § _, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7214 & 7215 requires periodic inspections of
registered auditing firms by the PCAOB and authorizing the agency to discipline violations of
auditing standards.
20 Zeff (2003a: 202) identifies the golden era of the accounting profession as 1940–60s and the
introduction of competitive pricing, pursuant to pressure from the US Department of Justice,
as a force leading auditors to be seen as members of an industry and not a profession.
Professor Zeff observes, ‘The heightened competitive climate in which the firms operated
seemed to haunt partners’ conduct of audit engagements’ (ibid.: 203). For other evidence that
price competition prevails within the industry and has a harmful effect on auditor
independence, GAO (2003c: 41) finds that the removal of restrictions on advertising and
direct solicitation of clients have had a more direct impact on auditor independence than
consolidation within the industry.
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signal their firm’s higher quality to investors.21 This too has significance
for the accounting industry performing as monopolists: the relative size
and reputation of auditors are intermingled so that in combination they
pose significant barriers to entry.
As seen in Part I, the accounting industry’s structure is unquestionably
that of an oligopoly. Nevertheless, the foregoing discussion also reflects
that the industry’s members are intensely competitive in the pricing of
audit services. Is this because, in Stigler’s formulation, the industry lacks
the ability to punish ‘cheaters’ because they lack the ability to coordinate
on setting a price for their services, cannot detect deviations, or lack the
ability to discipline deviating accounting firms? Insight into the failure of
the major accounting firms to misbehave as oligopolists is provided by
understanding the multiple roles that their provision of non-audit
services to their audit clients plays in their overall business strategy as
well as the strategic thinking of their audit clients. The next section
examines this, and explores the charitable explanation for the rising
importance of non-audit services: they are a means for accounting firms
to diversify their services, leverage their client relationships, and deviate
from oligopolistic pricing without being detected. That is, non-audit
services can be understood as a form of non-price competition (Ginsburg
1993).

I I I . T H E O L I GO P O LY S C R I P T: T H E P R O M I N E N C E O F
N O N - A U D I T S E RVI C E S

Because the auditor’s attest function is the heart of their engagement, the
auditor’s role is first and foremost that of a gatekeeper.22 Other
gatekeepers, such as underwriters and lawyers are also socialized into a
gatekeeper function, but their role in this endeavor does not involve a
21 Ireland and Lennox (2002) found that higher quality clients gravitate to Big Five
accounting firms but incur higher fees in doing so than lower-quality clients; Peel and Roberts
(2003) study of small UK audit clients found that they pay a premium when audited by Big Six
accounting firms, which is consistent with their seeking benefits of signaling their higher
quality over companies not audited; Chaney, Jeter and Lakshamanan (2004) show that private
firms that are not publicly-held choose auditors by fees and do not otherwise discriminate
between Big Five and non-Big Five firms.
22 Apropos of the significance of any intertwining of the audit function with commercial
relationships that jeopardize the independence of judgment of the auditor is the observation
by Chief Justice Berger that the auditor’s ‘public watchdog’s function demands that the
accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires complete
fidelity to the public trust.’ United States v Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984).
Gatekeepers have been closely examined by the commentators who generally attribute a
prominent role to them, particularly the outside accountant. See generally Hamdani (2003);
Coffee (2002); Partnoy (2001); Choi (1998); Jackson (1993); Kraakman (1986); and Gilson and
Kraakman (1984: 613–21).
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formal attestation.23 Hence, only indirectly do they come to their role of
being gatekeepers. It is a masterpiece of understatement, but no doubt
diplomatic, to observe that the accounting profession has not earned rave
reviews for its performance as gatekeepers in the aftermath of the recent
financial and accounting scandals in which accountants either recklessly
failed to detect their clients’ false reporting or were their accomplices in
their clients’ fraud. This section links the accountants’ failings to their
metamorphoses from an auditing firm into consulting firms that provide
audit services. The next section considers whether their metamorphosis
can be further understood as being made possible by the highlyconcentrated structure of the industry so that their recent evolution can
be understood as their misbehaving as a cartel.
The prime suspect for the accounting profession’s recent sorrowful
performance as a gatekeeper against financial frauds is the rising
importance of non-audit services in overall operations of the major
accounting firms.24 Non-audit service revenues now dominate the
income statement of the large accounting firms. A 2002 study of 1224
large public companies by the Investor Responsibility Research Center
found that in 2001 non-audit revenues garnered by the accountants
exceeded $4 billion whereas their audit fees totaled $1.58 billion.25 In
23 Underwriters are among the select group of persons that are liable under § 11(a)(5) of the
Securities Act if the registration statement for a public offering contains a material misrepresentation. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5). See e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation, 2004 US
Dist. Lexis 25155 (S.D.N.Y.). Lawyers find their role as gatekeepers no set forth in the SEC’s
attorney responsibility rules which impose a duty to report within the client organization
when the attorney has a reason to believe a violation of the securities laws or fiduciary duty
has occurred. See SEC (2004).
24 There has long been regulatory action focused on shielding the auditor’s independence
from being compromised by the rewards and attractiveness of consulting revenues. See, e.g.,
SEC (1979): ‘the growing importance of management advisory services to revenues, profits,
and competitive position of accounting firms—are a cause for legitimate concern as to the
impact of these activities on auditor independence, objectivity, and professionalism.’ This
release was later rescinded in the deregulatory wave of the Reagan Administration, although
in Accounting Series Release 296 the SEC states it had not changed its views of the problem
from that expressed in SEC (1979). Even before non-audit services became a dominant
component in the accounting firms’ business strategy, opinion was mixed whether the
provision of non-audit services to audit clients compromised the accountant’s independence.
Schulte (1965) reports a survey of 383 managers of financial institutions showing that 55%
believed the consulting function did not impair the accountant’s independence. Indeed,
when accounting firms were in the early stage of growing their consulting practices, positive
support for marrying the auditor to its client’s consulting needs was provided by the primary
professional organ tasked with assuring the independence of auditors (Public Oversight
Board 1979: l). Eight years later, an extensive survey by the AICPA’s Public Oversight Board
(1986) found over half the survey respondents believed certain business consulting practices,
such as merger advice, valuation of assets, and providing actuarial services compromised the
accountant’s independence. However, a GAO study (1996: ch. 2) equivocated on whether
consulting impaired the accountant’s independence and instead called on the accounting
profession to be attentive to the possibility that certain types of consulting could compromise
the auditor’s judgment. For a detailed review of studies of the impact of consulting on the
accountant’s independence, see Public Oversight Board (2000).
25 See Morgenson (2002).
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1976, audit fees constituted 70 per cent of accounting firm revenues; by
1998 audit fees had fallen to 31 per cent of the total. These changes
occurred because non-audit revenues were increasing three times faster
than revenues from audit services (Levitt 2000: 156; McNamee et al.
2000).26
As aptly put by then Big Eight member Deloitte Haskins & Sells’ CEO,
the
ultimate goal … [is] to change Deloitte’s self-image from that of a professional
firm that happened to be in business (the traditional view among the giant
CPA firms) to a business that happened to market Professional services.27

Indeed, by 1994, a blue-ribbon panel to study the accounting industry
found that five of the top seven consulting firms in the United States and
six of the top seven consulting firms worldwide were the then Big Six
accounting firms.28
Accountants argue that the marriage of various consulting services to
their audit function not only is efficient for their audit clients but also
enables the accountants to discharge their audit function due to the
heightened and more intense understanding of the client that comes
through their consulting activities. This argument has a good deal of
intuitive appeal but little empirical support. The one study of the link
between the intensity of the audit (measured by the hours expended on
the audit itself) and consulting found that billed audit hours increased as
a function of the amount of consulting.29 Thus, the provision of non-audit
services does not appear to yield scale economies for the audit itself.
Moreover, arguing that the provision of non-audit services enhances the
audit raises a further question about the quality of audits carried out by
accountants who do not enjoy a consulting relationship with their audit
clients. Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, in defending proposed
limits on consulting by auditors before Congress, reported that

26 Between 1990 and 1999, audit fees generated by the Big Five accounting firms for
SEC registrants declined from 71% to 48% of total revenues while fees for tax work
increased from 17% to 20% and consulting grew from 12% to 32% (Public Oversight Board
2000: 112). In absolute terms, the total 1999 revenues of the Big Five accounting firms derived
from SEC registrants was $26.5 billion; of this amount, $9.5 billion was generated from
auditing fees (ibid.). Public Accounting Report (2001) provides a breakdown of revenue
sources for the Big Five accounting firms. One study found that non-audit revenues paid by
1224 companies to their auditors were 2.5 times higher than audit revenues. Morgenson
(2002) discusses a 2001 study by Investor Responsibility Research Center that was repeated by
IRRC in 2002 with similar results. The 2002 study found that 72% of total fees paid by 1245
SEC registrants were for non-audit services. Longstreth (2002) finds a 2.69:1 ratio of non-audit
to audit fees.
27 See Zeff (2003b).
28 See Public Oversight Board (1994: 6).
29 See Davis, Ricchiute and Trompeter (1993).
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approximately 80 per cent of public reporting companies awarded no or
very little consulting work to their auditors. He observed (2000: 6),
[w]e do not believe that anyone would argue that the audits those companies
received were somehow inadequate because those companies did not receive
non-audit services from their auditors’.

Of further note regarding Chairman Levitt’s observation is that the
significant revenues accountants derive from consulting arises from a
distinct minority of their audit clients. Thus, non-audit services may well
be a dominant component of the total revenues of Big Four accounting
firms, but those revenues arise from a minority of their clients.
There are multiple reasons why the accounting firms placed such an
emphasis on growing their non-audit services revenues. An unwitting
accomplice in this effort was the efforts of many audit committees to
gauge the committee’s success by reducing the auditor’s fees rather than,
for example, enhancing the quality of the audit.30 The pressure on audit
fees also gave rise to a need for accounting firms to distinguish
themselves from their competitors by offering a wider range of services.31
Much of the revenue growth for non-audit services was based solely on
client demand; clients, believing that their auditors knew the client’s
business better than anyone else, concluded that there would be
economies by retaining the auditors for a range of consulting services
rather than to select a provider that was unfamiliar with the client’s
business and supporting systems.32 A further concern was the intense
competition among accounting firms to recruit talent to the quiet life of
the auditor. There was, of course, the quest to share the good life enjoyed
by the well-compensated investment bankers and others with whom the
accountants frequently interacted.33
Consider that the number of accounting majors declined 25 per cent
between 1995 and 2000 matching a near similar decline in the number of
individuals sitting for the national CPA exam.34 To attract talented
auditors, the accounting firms had to offer a broader professional profile
than being solely an auditor.35 This strategy also complemented the
See Hills (2002).
See Wyatt (2002).
32 See Public Oversight Board (2000: 110–11); McNamee et al. (2000: 156).
33 See Dugan (2002).
34 Balhoff (2002) stated the number of accounting majors declined from 60,000 in 1995 to
45,000 in 2000; further, that in the decade 1991–2000 the total number of those taking the CPA
exam had declined 33%. There is evidence that accounting has become more popular with
undergraduates. Gullapalli (2004) reports an 11% increase in the number of accounting
degrees awarded in 2003 over 2002; however, the number of accounting degrees awarded in
2003 were 10,000 less than the peak level of 60,000 in1994–95.
35 See Copeland (2002): ‘The best and the brightest seek positions that will allow them to
develop their expertise, to learn, to work on cutting issues…’
30
31
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reality that auditing work had by the 1990s become more complex and
technical so that audit teams needed to include technical non-accounting
experts who would have been underemployed absent consulting
opportunities.36 As a consequence, auditing firms found a significant
portion of their staffs being made up of individuals who came from
academic programs with less emphasis on professionalism and more on
technical skills than historically prevailed in professional accounting
programs.37 Finally, the profit margins and growth opportunities were
much greater with consulting than with auditing. Simply placed, profits
could better be obtained through expanding their consulting operations
than to expend efforts to rest audit clients from their competitors.
Therefore, various commercial forces that guided auditors and their
clients to the joint position that their auditors should carry out consulting
assignments for the client. From that point it was but a short step before
these same forces spun a web that obscured the auditors from their
primary professional undertakings. The popular media may rightly have
characterized the role of auditing services with the national accounting
firm’s repertoire as a ‘loss leader’ whereby the provision of audit services
enabled the accountants to get their foot in the door so that they could
thereafter provide more lucrative consulting services.38
As seen earlier, audit fees when scaled to their client’s size have
declined in the last decade. But as also seen, audit hours actually increase
with the level of non-audit services provided.39 Thus, we might speculate
what subtle trading occurred between the auditors and their clients that
permit higher audit fees to accompany rising non-audit service revenues.
Moreover, in view of the concentrated nature of the accounting industry
joined by the importance to audit clients of their auditor having the
stature of being a Big Four firm, there is cause to ponder why auditing
could not be more lucrative than it has been. As seen earlier, the industry
has long been dominated by a few national players so that conditions are
rife with the potential for anti-competitive pricing of their audit services.
However, the recent GAO study reports there is ‘no evidence that price
competition to date has been impaired’ by the high concentration within
the industry (2003a: 25).

See Public Oversight Board (2000: 112).
See Wyatt (2002: 3).
38 See Scheiber (2002). Consistent with the loss leader thesis is an Arthur Andersen internal
memorandum imposing a cap on the firm’s audit fees charged Waste Management Company
because the client was viewed as a ‘crown jewel’ with respect to the level of non-audit
revenues provided by Waste Management. See SEC (2001).
39 See Davis, Ricciute and Trompeter (1993). For others finding no negative correlation
between the level of audit fees and non-audit revenues, see Simunic (1980); Palmrose (1986).
Evidence that no negative correlation exists between audit and non-audit revenues to the
auditor’s clients is inconsistent with the ‘loss leader’ thesis.
36
37
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Moreover, the absence of anti-competitive pricing40 for their audit
services among the large public accounting firms is not driven by
demand elasticity for the services they provide. There is no substitute for
the service they offer; the law mandates that publicly-traded companies
must be audited by an independent auditor. Hence, the ‘loss leader’
thesis gains some traction as their failure to act opportunistically when
pricing the audit is consistent with the view they have, at least in until
very recently, pursued a strategy to use the marketing power they
enjoyed in one segment—the provision of audit services—to enter a more
competitive and extremely lucrative consulting segment. Certainly the
behaviour of the national accounting firms is consistent with the loss
leader thesis. For example, Ernst & Young set targets for non-audit
services that audit engagement partners were to meet with respect to each
client; missing a target resulted in a 10 per cent salary reduction.41 These
developments had an obvious impact on the culture of the auditing firm.
For example, firm leadership roles were more likely to be bestowed on
those who were successful marketers rather than the most diligent and
talented auditors (Wyatt 2002).42 And, completing the snare into which
the engagement auditor found herself, the auditors compensation was
frequently linked directly to the overall revenues produced attributed to
the audit client.43
Another more troubling explanation for the growth of non-audit
services is that management easily saw this was a way to keep the outside
auditor on a short leash. Management unhappy with the auditor’s
40 For a comprehensive study of the role fees played among 389 public firms that switched
auditors between 1983–87, see Ettredge and Greenberg (1990: 208): average fee reduction of
23% in the first year after switching auditors with even a greater reduction (28%) when client
selected auditor with perceived greater expertise within that industry as reflected by its
dominant market share of audits within that industry. Of note is that when there has been
greater government focus on whether auditors price their services competitively fees
declined. See Maher, Tiessen, Colson and Broman (1992) for a review of audit fees during the
1977–81 period when the accounting industry was subject to Congressional, Department of
Justice, and SEC scrutiny with respect to whether its was anti-competitive.
41 See Dugan (2002). Brown and Dugan (2002) report that Arthur Andersen adopted a
program in 1998 that called upon engagement partners to double revenues from their clients
by cross selling non-audit services.
42 Accordingly, technicians were eased out of management and became themselves
consultants to the auditing staff who were increasingly being overseen not by the most
talented auditors but those who could sell or possessed non-audit technical skills (Seidler
2002). For example, Arthur Andersen’s engagement partner for Waste Management
Company, a firm that would later be the focus of among the largest reporting violations to
occur in the 1990s, was Robert Allgyer, a marketing director in Arthur Andersen’s national
office whose job it was to coordinate the firm’s cross-selling efforts. See SEC (2001).
43 Turner (2002) states that the magnitude of audit and consulting fees measured the
profitability of the audit client and services of the engagement partner; Stewart (2002)
characterizes the year evaluation of engagement partners to be focused on what ‘kind of
business you brought in.’ There were even powerful incentives for engagement partners not
to question former financial statements as the auditor’s pay would be reduced when such a
restatement occurred (ibid).
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‘second guessing’ management’s artful use of accounting principles can,
of course, threaten to terminate the relationship. Under the current
regulatory regime, this threat can easily be stared down by the auditor; to
replace the accountant requires a prompt public disclosure on SEC Form
8-K,44 raising eyebrows within the investment community, and likely
inviting inquiry from the SEC. On the other hand, reducing or
eliminating the amount of non-audit services provided by the auditor is
not required to be disclosed on Form 8-K or anywhere else. Thus, the
provision of significant levels of non-audit services by the auditors
provides management with greater leverage over the auditor in the event
of disagreements between management and the auditors. That is,
managers who wish to conflict their auditor’s judgment can more easily
achieve this goal by increasing the revenues the auditor derives from the
provision of non-audit services. Herein lies one of the major concerns
underlying auditors providing non-audit services to their audit clients. A
further bond between the auditor and their client is that audit clients hire
a significant number of their auditor’s partners and staff to become
members of their senior management.45 Thus, the auditor frequently
finds herself staring across the desk into the piercing eyes of a former
colleague, or even boss.
There is no solid empirical support that non-audit services in fact
systematically compromise the quality of the outside accountant’s
audit.46 One point to begin to explore whether such a connection exists is
44 See Item 4 of Form 8-K. Form 8-K must be filed with the SEC within five days of a
change (whether by dismissal or resignation) of auditors. The disclosures that must
accompany notice of the change are extensive with respect to whether a dispute or
disagreement between the issuer and its former auditor. See Item 304 or Regulation S-K, 17
C.F.R. § 229.304 (2004).
45 See generally Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 42994 (12 July 2000)(detailing these
practices). Note in this regards that Sarbanes-Oxley adds § 10A(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(l) (Supp.
2003), to the Exchange Act barring auditors from certifying the financial statements of a
reporting company if certain senior financial officers of the client if such officer had within
one year carried out an audit of the reporting company for the auditing firm.
46 It remains a matter of speculation whether the accountant’s oversight of their audit
clients’ financial statements was diminished by the Supreme Court’s holding in Central Bank
of Denver v First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), that there was no aiding and
abetting liability under the antifraud provision. Since accountants continue to be liable for
misstatements and omissions in the financial statements they audit, see Anixeter v Home-Stake
Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996), cf. Wright v Ernst & Young LLP., 152 F.3d 169 (2d
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999), it is difficult to conclude that Central Bank provides
any more than perhaps a false sense of security to the auditor. Arguably, the most significant
weakening of the legal environment for auditing occurred earlier when the Supreme Court
held that scienter was required for there to be a violation of the antifraud provision. See Ernst
& Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). By eliminating the possibility of negligence as a basis
for liability, one might conclude that Ernst & Ernst induces less caution on the part of the
auditors. There are at least two weaknesses to this argument. First, there is no reasonable basis
to conclude that negligence was ever the standard or even an acceptable standard before Ernst
& Ernst. See Cox (1977). Secondly, scienter was and continues to be an acceptable standard of
fault under the antifraud provision. See e.g., Sanders v John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th
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with the odor emitted by the rise in earnings restatements. For the past
decade, the period in which the auditors have been more than just
auditors, financial markets have been treated with an ever increasing
number of earnings restatements.47 Even though restatements do not
necessarily suggest fraud, they may nonetheless be seen as equivalent to
fraudulent reporting sans scienter. Evidence of the link between the
auditor’s independence and the provision of audit services is mixed. An
early study examining this connection points in the other direction. The
Panel on Audit Effectiveness studied 126 audit engagements, identifying
37 (26 per cent) in which non-audit services were provided (Public
Oversight Board 2000). The Panel concluded that in none of these cases
did the provision of non-audit services compromise the quality of the
audit; the Panel even opined that in one-fourth of the audits that were
accompanied by non-audit services that the consulting work had a
positive impact on the quality of the audit (ibid.: 113).48 The Panel report,
however, did not probe the more subtle question of whether non-audit
fees or even more generally the total fees received from the client
compromised the auditor’s judgment; the Panel’s focus was instead on
whether the act of providing any level of non-audit services impeded the
audit function.49
That such a connection exists between the auditor’s independence and
consulting has a good deal of intuitive support. A more refined inquiry is
whether the relative strength of any correlation between the auditor’s
financial ties with the client and compromises in the auditor’s
professional judgment is context dependent. This could well explain two
strikingly dissimilar leading studies of whether non-audit services
compromise the accountants’ judgments. A 2002 study found no
Cir. 1977); Kiernan v Homeland Inc., 611 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1984). Thus, the auditor who
becomes aware of a possible misrepresentation committed by management, but turns a blind
eye to further investigating it would appear to have acted at least recklessly.
47 In 1990, there were 33 earnings restatements. In five years, the number of restatements
increased by 50% to 50 restatements. In 2000, there were 157 earnings restatements, more than
triple the number five years earlier and five times the number at the beginning of the decade
and in 2002 this number reached a record high of 330. See Huron Consulting Group (2003);
Wu (2001). See generally GAO (2002). Earnings statements are accompanied by price
adjustments in the security of the restating firm. One estimate places the loss in market value
due to restatements made for the period 1998–2000 at $73 billion. See Moriarty and Livingston
(2001). The GAO (2003d) estimated unadjusted market losses of $100 billion. Earnings
restatements are symptomatic of the aggressive and opportunistic use of accounting
principles. Opacity and lacunae in accounting metrics were shamelessly exploited by the
firm’s managers. Too frequently, it appears, the public accountants accorded their audit client
the benefit of any ambiguity in accounting principles.
48 Antel, Gordon, Narayanamoorthy and Zhou (2002) find no higher correlation between
abnormal accruals and higher audit or non-audit fees, although other studies cited in this
chapter have reached a contrary result; Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) find the greater
the non-audit services the more likely it is that analysts’ forecasts will be met or exceeded and
that there will be larger discretionary accruals.
49 See Seidler (2002).
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statistical correlation between non-audit service fees and the auditor
providing a going concern qualification to its audit opinion (DeFond,
Raghunandan and Subramanyam 2002). 50
In contrast, another study published in 2002 finds that non-audit fees
are positively associated with various indicia of earnings management by
audited firms (Frankel, Johnson and Nelson 2002).51 The latter study
finds that the frequency of abnormal accruals increases as more non-audit
services are provided by the firm’s auditors. The conflicting results of the
two studies need not lead to conflicting policy implications. Auditors
may more easily succumb to management’s manipulation of reported
earnings when the firm is not financially distressed because the auditors
view their own reputation and litigation exposure as not threatened in
such context. On the other hand, when their client is financially
distressed, the auditor’s reputation and litigation exposure is increased so
that it might be much less deferential to management judgments. Indeed,
we should expect—absent self-serving concerns such as fear of
litigation—that the auditor will accord a good deal of deference to the
judgments and choices of their audit client. Well recognized cognitive
forces no doubt compromise the auditor’s independence. The most
dominant force at play is that of self-interest. That is, individuals, even
professionals, are not very good at acting impartially when their
self-interest dictates otherwise.52
The GAO’s study of the accounting profession found in its survey of
clients, accountants, and academics mixed reports whether the
consolidation that began within the industry in the late 1980s had made
auditors less independent or otherwise adversely affect the quality of
audits. For example, 60 per cent of the large public companies surveyed
believed their auditors were more independent post- consolidation
whereas 18 per cent believed their auditor’s independence had become
50 The study focused on 1158 firms that, during a 4 month period in 2001, were financially
distressed (defined to mean the firm either had negative earnings or operating cash-flows)
and within this group assessed whether a firm was less likely to obtain a going-concern
qualification if their auditors in comparison to the ratio of non-audit to audit revenues. For a
study finding no correlation between earnings restatements and the level of non-audit
services provided by the accountants, Raghunandan, Read and Whisenant (2003) find that
non-audit fees for 100 firms making earnings restatements not statistically different than
larger sample that did not engage in restatements.
51 The study finding that indicia of earnings management are exceeding forecasted
earnings, and the magnitude of various discretionary accruals. Another study found such a
correlation, but it was only statistically significant for non-Big Five auditors (Francis and Ke
2002).
52 For a discussion of the social and psychological forces that can compromise the auditor’s
independence, see Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman (2005). Audit committees also may
suffer behavioral limits when confronted with a reporting crisis, see Beecher-Monas (2003):
cognitive dissonance makes it difficult for a committee to revisit its prior decisions and its risk
preference may be magnified due to group polarization.
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worse (2003a: 41).53 There are abundant anecdotal reports of professional
judgments being so compromised.54 This indeed is an area where it
would not be foolish to trust one’s intuition. Doing so, however, has
significant implications for considering the social welfare implications of
auditors having collateral but dependent relationships with their audit
clients (Wyatt 2002):
[T]he loss of a client is a negative in one’s career path. Since many decisions
required of audit firm managers and partners are judgmental in nature, rather
than clearly prescribed by extraneous forces, such judgments are, at the margin, sometimes influenced by perceptions of the attitudes of leaders of a given
firm. If those perceptions by firm audit personnel are that the loss of a client is
damaging to one’s career path, the judgments made may be more in the direction of keeping the client than to achieving the fair presentation of financial
statements.55

It is also possible to conclude it is myopic to focus so intently on the
revenues associated with non-audit services. Audit failures predate the
accounting industry’s undertaking significant consulting activities (Pitt
2002). Indeed, a good deal of the auditor’s independence is compromised
by the sheer magnitude of the audit fees associated with a client,
especially if they view these fees as a perpetuity (Breeden 2002).56 With
there being few instances historically of firms changing their auditors, the
auditors can easily come to view the yearly audit revenues from a client
as a perpetuity.57 So seen, the value of a client relationship can easily be
53 Of interest is the report of other possible impacts of other factors on audit quality.
According to knowledgeable individuals, a variety of factors may have had a more direct
impact on audit quality and auditor independence than consolidation. For example, they
cited the removal of restrictions against advertising and direct solicitation of clients, the
increased relative importance of management consulting services to accounting firms, legal
reforms, changing auditing standards, and a lack of emphasis on the quality of the audit by
clients and some capital market participants.
54 For example, in the Enron/Andersen case, an Andersen e-mail reveals that members of
the engagement team were concerned about Enron’s financial statements, but that same
e-mail also cautioned that future work for Enron ‘could reach $100 million per year.’ See
Mayer (2002). McRoberts and Alexander (2002: 1) quote a former Andersen client who
observed, ‘[T]he more consulting business we did with them, the more companies they
would refer to me and the easier their audit partners would be in approving the deals’.
55 Kaplan (2004: 366–68) details the pressures on the auditor to retain her client.
56 See also Prentice (2000: 209) reviewis studies reflecting that auditors are more likely to
accede to the client’s reporting choice when the client is large.
57 See e.g., GAO (2003b: 1): of 159 respondents to the GAO survey, 37 had switched
accountants within 2 years due to the demise of Arthur Andersen, 3 switched accountants
within 2 years for other reasons, 10 had switched within past 2–5 years and eighteen had
switched within past 6–10 years. This means that the bulk of those surveyed had been with the
same accounting firm for more than a decade. This changed in 2003, with slightly more than
one-third of the Russell 3000 firms changing auditors (excluding changes caused by the
demise of Arthur Andersen) (Krantz 2004). Michaels (2004) reports a study by Glass Lewis
regarding 900 auditor changes in 2003.
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determined by capitalizing the yearly audit fee at a low discount
rate—low to reflect the small likelihood that the relationship will be
terminated. This calculus yields a very high dollar value the engagement
partner can place on preserving the relationship with the audit client.58 It
is that calculation that underlies the arguments advanced by those who
favour the periodic rotation of auditors.
On the other hand, thoughts of strengthening the auditor’s
independence by mandating the periodic rotation of auditing firms must
confront the realities of the marketplace, and more importantly the high
concentration levels within the industry. The GAO study found that 88
per cent of those surveyed reported that if required to switch auditing
firms periodically they would not consider a smaller (i.e., non-Big Four)
firm (2003a: 26).59 This survey is supported by the practices followed by
those firms who had been Arthur Andersen clients before its demise in
2002; 87 per cent of the former 1,085 former Arthur Andersen public
company clients migrated to a Big Four firm (ibid.: 107, Table 10).60
Finally, even those who support the belief there are social justifications
for auditors to provide consulting services to their audit clients must
address the awkward juxtaposition this poses since that the same
relationship, if carried out by a director, could prevent a director from
being deemed independent as defined by applicable listing and SEC
requirements. That is, an ongoing consulting relationship will prevent a
director from being considered independent under both the NYSE and
Nasdaq listing requirements,61 but no such prohibition occurs for the
58 For example, the most recent audit fees Arthur Andersen received from Enron were $25
million. If viewed as a perpetuity and capitalized at 10%, the value of. the Arthur
Andersen/Enron relationship to Arthur Andersen is $250 million.
59 The study suggests that in light of likely serious costs and difficult to measure benefits of
mandatory audit firm rotation the recommended course is to monitor closely the effects of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to determine if enhanced independence of auditors can be achieved
through its provisions; GAO (2004) sets forth the questionnaires and summary of responses
that were the basis for GAO (2003a).
60 The number five firm, Grant Thornton, obtained over 30% of the former Arthur Andersen
clients who did not engage a Big Four firm.
61 Under NYSE Rule 303A.02, no director with a ‘material relationship’ with a listed
company, either directly or as a partner, shareholder, or officer of an organization that has a
relationship with the company, is deemed independent. Factors determining whether a
‘material relationship’ exists include consulting relationships. The board is to determine
whether the relationship poses such a conflict; however, the NYSE provides that, among other
factors, receipt during the prior three years of more than $100,000 per year in direct
compensation from the listed company (other than director or committee fees) or being an
executive officer of a company that receives payments which in any single fiscal year exceeds
the greater of $1 million or 2% of such other company’s consolidated gross income. The listing
requirements for Nasdaq are slightly different as Nasdaq Rule 4200 reference point is. $60,000
in payments or being a partner, executive or controlling stockholder of an entity that received
the greater of 5% of its consolidated gross revenues or $200,000. We could well find that a
audit partner who garnered more than $100,000 (or $60,000 for a Nasdaq listed company) as a
consequence of sharing in non-audit fees from the audit client would not meet the standard of
independence applied to directors. Also, since it is the opinion of the audit firm and not the
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accountant unless it falls within one of the limited areas proscribed by
Sarbanes-Oxley.62 Both the auditor and the outside director serve crucial
monitoring functions of management’s stewardship. However, the
auditor’s task can be seen as the more demanding and important because
the auditor is required to carry out a professional investigation
discharged with reasonable care and to attest as to its findings. Just how
can we demand of such a person a lower level of independence than we
expect of the outside directors who depend on the auditor’s services?

I V. P R A CT I CE M E E T S T H E O RY

The evidence is clear that the Big Eight and later Big Five accounting
firms collectively transformed themselves from audit firms to business
consulting firms that also provided audit services. Their great
competitive advantage over non-auditing consulting firms was that the
accounting firms could bundle their audit function with their consulting
services. By competing with pure consulting firms the accounting firms
enjoyed operational efficiencies that flowed from their greater familiarity
with their clients’ problems and systems. Certainly there is every reason
to believe there were operational synergies to be reaped by melding some
of the staid audit functions with the early stages of a challenging
consulting project. We might also speculate whether they enjoyed another
advantage over the pure consulting rivals—the accountants could trade
off the quality of their audits to obtain consulting revenues whereas their
pure consulting rivals had nothing comparable to put on the bargaining
table. As will be seen, the marriage of consulting to auditing poses
distinct risks to the auditor’s independence and, hence, the overall
quality of the audit. To such risks we might question whether the market
would not penalize firms whose auditor’s independence was perceived
as being seriously compromised by the provision of non-audit services.
Financial theory supports the view that any such a disclosure risk (i.e.,
individual accountant, the focus arguably should be on the revenues of the audit firm and not
the individual auditor. Under this approach, the audit firm’s independence would be with
reference to the $100,000 (or $60,000) figure. Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt (2000) also
called for stricter standards for auditor independence: ‘A public accountant acknowledges no
master by the public. But when auditors engage in extensive services for an audit client truly
unrelated to the audit, they must now also serve another master—management. In this role,
the auditor who guards the integrity of the numbers, now both oversees and answers to
management … [If auditing is a loss leader for valuable consulting] it is becoming more and
more difficult to ascertain where one relationship ends and another begins’.
62 Somewhat related is the notion that an investment by the auditor in its audit client or a
direct ‘business relationship’ disqualifies the auditor, but providing non-audit services does
not. See Longstreth (2002: 7): ‘[If the definition of] “business relationship” does not include
audit services’ one faces the absurdity of a rule that is absolute in banning financial and
business relationships that are utterly inconsequential while appearing to allow any level of
non-audit fees to be paid to the audit firm.’
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weakened trustworthiness of a company’s financial reports) will
effectively raise the firm’s cost of capital due to investors discounting the
traded firm’s security market price. Therefore, would not this be a
market-based solution to possible abuses so that audit clients would find
it in their interest to moderate or eliminate such a discount? Moreover,
would not such a pricing dynamic cause some accounting firms to
distinguish themselves from their rivals by taking the ‘high road’ of
refusing to certify the financial statements of firms to whom they
provided audit services?
Financial theory appears not to have guided the marketing department
of any accounting firm. No accounting firms made any effort to enhance
its relative reputation for independence and the quality of its audits by
refusing to provide consulting services to its audit clients. Instead, each of
the Big Eight and later Big Five and now Final Four firms aggressively
pursued consulting services with their audit clients. None sought to step
aside from the pack by assuring financial statement-users that its audit
enjoyed greater independence than that of rivals because the auditor did
not provide consulting services to its clients. Instead, all firms pursued
the same parallel behaviour of leveraging their audit relationship to
expand their profits through the rapid growth of consulting. There
should be little doubt that each firm’s pursuit of this parallel strategy was
made possible by the industry’s concentration.63 In their joint pursuit of
consulting, the dominant accounting firms behaved as a cartel and they
were assisted in so behaving by the nature of auditing and the
questionable goals of their audit clients. The contributions of each of
these is examined below.
Auditing is not a service that can easily be commoditized. As seen
earlier, the demands each audit assignment invites discrete pricing
decisions so that pre-agreed-to pricing by cartel members is not realistic
and, correlatively, deviation from an agreed-upon price will be
impossible to detect. But more importantly, external assessments by
investors of the quality of a particular audit are equally impossible. The
inability of financial statement users to determine the quality of an audit
makes it highly problematic for market-based forces to either discipline
or penalize firms obtaining poor audits. To be sure, the ‘markets of
lemons’ argument is that the market will raise the cost of all firms by an

63 Professors Macey and Sale (2003: 1177) provide a complementary view of the industry.
Two important forces they identify as explaining why auditors in recent years have less
concern for their professional reputation are the advent of the LLP form of their doing
business and the SEC’s commodification of ‘independence.’ These forces are not, however,
independent of the industry’s structure since a more competitive structure could be expected
to introduce competition among auditors on the basis of their relative reputation and
independence.
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amount equal to the expected cost of weak audits averaged across all
firms. Even this overstates the case for such market discounting. First, not
until 2000 was there much disclosure regarding the amount any public
firm paid its auditors for non-audit services. Before 2000, investors lacked
information whether a specific publicly-traded company engaged its
auditors as consultants. And, as will be examined below, today the
disclosures that are now required are opaque. Secondly, there are other
investor concerns that can be equally compelling bases for compromising
the accountant’s independence. An example of such a factor is the
long-term relationship between auditors and their clients, and
particularly the value of that relationship; as seen earlier, the Arthur
Andersen/Enron relationship was not just a perpetuity, but a highly
valuable perpetuity independent of the consulting fees that accompanied
that relationship. Enron in this regard is no different than most public
firms where changing accounting firms has long been seen as an
infrequent event. Other compromising relationships appear in the degree
former auditor firm staff members are now within the client’s executive
suite. Thirdly, the auditor assigned to the audit or the supervising
attorney may wish to obtain a position with the audit client. The lure of a
position with an audit client is well understood generally and has long
been a potential perk of the sometimes nomadic and underpaid auditor.
As a result, the audit personnel may be reluctant to raise with the audit
client issues that will jeopardize her obtaining a future position with the
client.
Fourthly, poor audits can arise for reasons other than a lack of
independence. The quality of the auditors assigned to the engagement
may be poor or their supervisors overworked or distracted. The latter is a
real fear in light of the evidence, reviewed earlier, that audit fees have
declined relative to the size and complexity of their audit clients. Thus,
supervisors are responsible either for more audit clients or larger more
involved audits than years earlier. Either event erodes the quality of the
audit. Factors such as these confound the external assessment of the
quality of an audit and the overall trustworthiness of a firm’s financial
statements so that markets are poor forces to discipline firms for retaining
their auditors to provide consulting services. Thus, any market-based
penalty that may be imposed because auditors perform auditing services
for its client may at best be an obscured impact.
Quite independent of market-based incentives for firms to eliminate or
moderate ties the auditors might have that compromise their
independence is management’s interest in obtaining a ‘good’ audit. This
aspect of the professional issue poses a problem of definition. When we
refer to a good audit from whose perspective is this assessment to be
made? Management that has an interest in presenting a smoother
earnings record, such as was sought by the management at Freddie
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Mac,64 would like an auditor that concurs in the host of accounting
choices management makes in reporting the firm’s financial performance
and position. Similarly, a firm that wishes to report eye-popping double
digit earnings growth, such as, Enron (and too many others that have
now filled the headlines), will also think a ‘good’ audit is one with a
minimum of second guessing of management’s accounting decisions. As
seen earlier, when the accountant has a relationship with the client that is
seriously bounded with a valuable financial relationship, and especially
when that relationship has a low reporting profile such that terminating
that relationship is not a reportable event, the relationship necessarily
poses a dire risk of impacting the degree of the auditor’s independence.
Unscrupulous managers, as well as managers who wish accounting
decisions that place the best possible spin on the company’s financial
performance and position, each find a market for audit services that is not
professionally independent. In a sense, this dynamic transformed audits
from a service that was distinctly tailored to the needs of a client into a
commodity. What was standardized was not the audit service, but the
attestation that the audit provided. That is, evidence during the last two
decades reflects that auditors did not raise their audit fees to assure
reasonable staffing of audits. Instead, audit fees were secondary to the
pursuit of non-audit revenues. One can only conclude that independence
on the part of the auditor was not a valued commodity by either the
auditor or its client; clean audit opinions were valued and that was what
was sold to the clients.
Not all public companies have engaged in restatements or had their
executives accused of cooking the firm’s books. And, not all firms
retained their auditors to provide consulting services or recruited their
auditors to their managerial ranks. We can thus speculate that there
might have been a market for a truly independent auditing firm if one
wished to step forward by defining itself by what its rivals were not. But
no accounting firm stepped forward to claim this niche market. Each of
the big accounting firms followed the same course and with great reward
to itself. One would have expected that in a competitively structured
industry that one area of competition would be on the cornerstone of
auditing, the appearance of independence from the client. That did not
exist and suggests the strength of the cartel.
64 In 2003, Freddie Mac announced a forthcoming restatement of approximately $4.5 billion.
The restatement corrected accounting errors from the misapplication of reporting derivatives
in 2001 and 2002. Management at Freddie Mac had structured financial transactions for the
purpose of smoothing volatility in the firm’s earnings. Through the misuse of Treasury
securities—falsely characterizing them as derivatives and accounting for them as hedging
transactions—Freddie Mac lowered its reported hedging costs. At the end of 2002, it held
approximately $16 billion in Treasuries as debt hedges. Federal regulators later fined Freddie
Mac $125 million for its accounting abuses. See generally, Dwyer and Miller (2003); Barta and
McKinnon (2003).
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V. T H E RE GU L ATO RY RE S P O N S E : A R E WE O N T H E R I GH T
TRACK?

The procedures and practices to be followed by auditors of public
companies have customarily been established by a body within the
American Institute of Public Accounting (AICPA), the Public Oversight
Board (POB). However, in May 2000, confidence in self-regulation was
seriously shaken when the POB was thwarted in its effort to examine the
impact on the auditor’s independence vis-a-vis its client when the
auditors were also providing to their clients substantial non-audit
services, such as consulting, tax advice, or computer systems
management. In response to this initiative, the AICPA cut off its funding
to its POB.65 Concern for the accounting profession’s influence over both
accounting principles and auditing standards prompted Congress to
include in Sarbanes-Oxley authorization for the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Indeed, the formal name of the
act includes ‘Public Company Accounting Reform.’
Section 101 of Sarbanes-Oxley creates a five-person nonprofit
corporation, the PCAOB, that will be led by five individuals who are
appointed by the SEC (with the concurring approval of the Secretary of
Treasury and Chairman of the Federal Reserve System).66 Among the
duties assigned to the PCAOB is overseeing the registration of public
accounting firms (accounting firms cannot audit the financial statements
of a reporting company unless the accounting firm is registered with the
PCAOB), to establish or adopt rules regarding auditing procedures
including auditor independence standards, and to conduct inspections,
investigations and disciplinary proceedings. The PCAOB should enjoy
greater independence than the predecessor POB because it is funded from
a share of filing fees paid by public companies and registered
accountants.67 Incidentally, Congress was also concerned about the
independence of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the
private sector’s major authority for accounting principles (i.e., GAAP).
Hence, Sarbanes-Oxley provides that a Self-Regulatory Organization
(SRO) (here, read FASB) will no longer be considered an authoritative
body with respect to GAAP unless, among other features, its funding

65 The SEC practice section (SECPS) of the AICPA threatened to discontinue funding in May
2000. Following the receipt of its announcement, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt stated (2000):
‘This development is a significant setback to self regulation. Indeed, it raises serious questions
as to the profession’s commitment to self-regulation.’ A storm of protest ensued and the
AICPA reinstated funding for the POB. In doing so, the AICPA explained that it did not intend
to cut funding for special reviews; it only intended to suspend work until an agreement
between the SEC, the POB, and the SECPS was reached. See Tie (2000).
66 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e) (4).
67 See 15 U.S.C. § 7219.
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comes solely from filing fees collected by the SEC.68 The FASB hence has
taken its cue and is funded by the fees of SEC registrants.
The PCAOB carries out annual reviews (‘inspections’) of audit work
performed by accounting firms registered with it (an exception exists for
once every three years for firms auditing 100 or fewer reporting
companies). Copies of the report from each inspection is filed with the
SEC as well as state accountancy boards. These reports provide the first
basis in the history of the profession for collecting information relative to
the quality, and hence deserved reputation, of the major accounting
firms. As a self-regulatory organization, the PCAOB has the power to
discipline its registrants and, hence, the power to carry out investigations
for the purpose of possibly disciplining a registered accounting firm.69 It
may also refer a matter to the SEC for further investigation and
enforcement action.70 Section 107 provides the SEC with oversight
responsibility for the PCAOB so that none of its rules become effective
without the prior approval of the SEC, and the SEC may amend any
existing PCAOB rule.71
In the hearings that preceded the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, several
witnesses testified that the auditing process may be compromised
because auditors view their responsibility as serving the company’s
management and not the full board of directors or, for that matter, the
shareholders (US Senate 2002: 31). Auditors who have this perspective of
their relationship pose two important concerns. Auditors who
understand that their future retention depends on the same managers
whose financial statements they are to review will behave accordingly.
They cannot be expected to pose strong challenges to the accounting
decisions made by management without knowing that by doing so they
jeopardize their continuing relationship with the client. Also, auditors
who view their professional relationship to be with the company’s
managers, and not its directors or stockholders, are more likely to view
inquiries put to the auditors by the outside directors to be intrusive or
simply irrelevant to their engagement.
Concerns related to the independence of the auditors from the
company’s managers are central to the Sarbanes-Oxley.72 A key provision
of the Act anchors the accountant’s relationship in the audit committee
See 15 U.S.C. § 7215 ((c)(4)(6).
See also Public Oversight Board (2003).
70 See 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(4)(B). The SEC’s authority to discipline accountants who practice
before it coexists with the PCAOB’s disciplinary authority; indeed, the SEC’s authority in this
respect was affirmed in Sarbanes-Oxley. See Securities Exchange Act Section 4C, 15 U.S.C. §
78d-3, added by § 202 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
71 [to come.]
72 Notably, reform efforts have focused not on the substance of reporting obligations, but on
strengthening the financial reporting culture to achieve better compliance with reporting
standards. See generally Bratton (2003); Seligman (2002).
68
69
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and not management.73 The Act further buttresses its separation of the
auditor from the managers by tightening the definition of independence for audit committee members from that embraced just a few years
earlier by the Blue Ribbon Committee, mandating that audit committees
maintain procedures to address complaints regarding the issuer’s
accounting, internal controls or other auditing related matters, and
empowering audit committees to engage as necessary independent
advisors at the issuer’s expense.74 Pursuant to authority set forth in a
companion provision, the SEC has adopted criteria for a member of an
audit committee to be considered a ‘financial expert’ and reporting
companies are now required to disclose whether its audit committee
includes a financial expert, and if not, the reasons for not having such a
person on the committee.75 The importance of financial expertise on the
audit committee is supported by a comprehensive study of governance
criteria linked to earnings restatements. The study found that mere
independence of the board or the audit committee was unrelated to
likelihood of a company engaging in an earnings restatement; however,
the probability of an earnings restatement are significantly negatively
correlated with the audit committee composed of those with an
accounting or finance background (Agrawal and Chadha 2002). 76
73 See Sarbanes Oxley § 301 (amending § 10A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78f, mandating
that the SEC direct that the exchanges and the NASD adopt rules that provide that the audit
committee ‘shall be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of
the work’ of the company’s auditor). A few months before Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted, both
the NYSE and Nasdaq tightened several of their governance requirements in areas that were
later dealt with by Sarbanes-Oxley. For example, the proposed listing changes for both
bodies’ require that audit committees must have the authority to retain and terminate the
auditor. This requirement is, as seen above, now reflected in Sarbanes-Oxley.
For the view that anchoring the relationship in the audit committee may not be sufficient,
see Cunningham (2004) who provides a thoughtful analysis of the benefits and burdens of
auditors being retained by the reporting company’s insurance carrier; Ronen (2002) provides
a less refined model of the relationship recommended by Professor Cunningham.
Professor Bratton (2003: 482–84) argues the auditor’s relationship should be developed
from a positive law perspective and not narrowly on the shareholder primacy model so that
the accountant’s fidelity is to a system of fair, even conservative, reporting as contrasted with
an agency model (anchored in the shareholders) where accounting choices are made to
present a optimistic image of the firm’s financial performance and position.
74 See Sarbanes Oxley § 301 [?](barring any compensation to the audit committee member
except director fees, whereas previously independence existed so long as the amount
received did not exceed $60,000). The SEC does, however, have authority to grant exemptions
as it deems appropriate (ibid.).
75 See Section 407 (listing criteria for consideration); Item 401(h) of Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. §
229.401(h)( )(establishing a two-part test for financial expert); Item 309 of Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. §
229.309 ( )(requiring disclosure of whether the audit committee includes a ‘financial expert’).
Investors appear to value financial expertise on the part of audit committee members.
Davidson, Xie and Xu (2004) study 136 small public companies that announced appointments
to audit committee found significant positive stock price reaction when the new members
had financial expertise.
76 The authors’ data also show that the negative correlation is strengthened further if the
audit committee includes the company’s chief financial officer. They explain the puzzling
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Importantly, the SEC’s new rules, as well as the listing requirements of
the NYSE and Nasdaq, impose a dialogue between the audit committee
and the outside accountants for the purpose of eliciting any warning
signs in the reporting system or management’s disclosure policies and
practices. The auditor is to report, among other factors, on material issues
that have surfaced in its assessment of the firm’s internal controls as well
as any discussions it has had with management regarding the firm’s
internal controls. The auditors must also share with the audit committee
written communications it has had with management regarding ‘critical’
accounting decisions with management as well as identifying ‘critical’
areas of the financial reports where an accounting estimate or principle
change would affect the quality of the presentation.77 The NYSE and
Nasdaq listing requirements also mandate a discussion between
management and the audit committee covering a range of topics,
including a review of the quarterly and annual reports, earnings press
releases, and earnings guidance given to analysts. 78
Sarbanes-Oxley also restricts the revolving door through which the
accountant’s staff moved themselves into the managerial ranks of its
audit clients. The pervasiveness of the steely eyes of the CFO looking into
the glazed eyes of her former protégé, now auditor, is reflected in a study
that found that among nearly 700 former Arthur Andersen clients one in
five had at least one former employee of a major audit firm in the top
executive ranks and, upon the demise of Arthur Andersen nearly
one-half of the executives of firms formerly audited by Arthur Andersen
who previously were themselves formerly in public accounting chose
their former accounting firm to become their company’s new auditor.79
The Act, however, fell short of more sweeping steps to secure the
accountant’s independence. The Act does not bar all consulting for audit
clients. Instead it forbids certain consulting to be engaged in and
conditions other types of consulting on obtaining prior approval from the
audit committee. Furthermore, the Act does not sunset the client-auditor
relationship by requiring periodic rotation of audit firms.

result with respect to the CFO being a member of the audit committee as the CFO providing a
convenient channel for the flow of pertinent information that enables the committee to be
more effective. For further evidence of the positive effects of financial expertise on the audit
committee, see Davidson, Xie and Xu, (2004).
77 See Rule 2–07 of Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § ( ).
78 For example, the listing requirements of the NYSE call for the audit committee to ‘discuss
the company’s earnings press releases, as well as financial information and earnings guidance
provided to analysts and rating agencies.’ NYSE Rule 303A.07(c)(iii)(C). See also Nasdaq
Marketplace Rule 4350(d).
79 See Countryman (2002).
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V I . T H E L I F E O F T H E A C C O U N TA N T: P O S T- S A R B A N E S - O X L E Y

So what has changed after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002?
The most tangible measure of change is that audit fees have increased.80
This is no doubt due to a variety of forces that include increased
disclosure demands ushered in by Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC regulations
(not all of which are compelled by the Act), greater litigation exposure on
the part of accountants due to a post-Enron morality, and a need to
replace reduced consulting revenues. As seen, post-Sarbanes-Oxley the
accountants have a narrower field of consulting services they can provide
their audit clients. Sarbanes-Oxley bars accountants from providing
certain non-audit services to their clients and mandates pre-approval by
the audit committee for those non-audit services not barred that are to be
performed for the client. Nevertheless, reports confirm that auditors
continue to earn from their audit clients significant consulting revenues.
For example, the Wall Street Journal’s tally for the thirty companies that
make up the Dow Jones Industrial Average showed that in 2002 that 62
per cent of the revenues received by the auditors from their clients were
for non-audit services (Bryan-Low 2003c).81 The reported amount is
down slightly from the year before figure of 75 per cent; however, it is
unclear what portion of the decline can be attributed to a stagnant
economy or, for that matter, an increase in charges for auditing. More
recently, consulting fell slightly in 2003 from its year earlier level, but the
2003 decline could also reflect the effects of the first year effects of the
SEC’s more liberal definition of audit fees, examined later.82 Investor
concerns have caused some companies to terminate consulting projects
with their auditors (Bryan-Low 2003b). One front where there is very
little evidence that public companies are questing greater independence
80 See Kimmel and Vasquez (2003) report an average increase of 27% in 2002 for audit fees
among Standard and Poor’s 500 companies; Glass Lewis & Co. (2004) report overall fees
increased 16% from 2002 to 2003, based on information in the proxy statements of 2250 sample
companies compared to assets of the sample firms increasing 10% and inflation increasing at
2.3%. It should be noted that audits in 2003 do not report one of the full effects of
Sarbanes-Oxley: the heightened disclosures related to internal control evaluations that are
mandated by § 404 of the act which do not become effective until 2004.
81 It should be noted that three of the Final Four accounting firms have spun off their
consulting operations. Only Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu has not, recently canceling its efforts
to do so because of the inability to finance the spin-off of its consulting operations (Frank and
Solomon 2003). The spinning-off of a firm’s consultants does not mean that the auditing firm
does no consulting. The spin-off involves a range of practice areas, but not all areas are
spun-off. The most obvious practice area that continues within the auditing firm is the
provision of tax advice.
82 Plitch and Rapoport (2004) cite a study carried out by Investor Responsibility Research
Center of 1652 companies that included most of the Fortune 500 firms that found that in 2003
non-audit fees represented 42% of total fees received by accountants from their audit clients.
Weil (2004) reports data for 21 of the 30 companies making up the index, audit fees increased
18% whereas total payments to auditors declined 11%; nonetheless, 48.5% of total revenues
paid accountants was due to non-audit services.
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in their auditors is on their willingness to change auditing firms
periodically. There is yet to appear evidence of a broad movement toward
regular rotation of accounting firms. The relationship between auditor
and client therefore continues to reflect a perpetuity so that the value of
that relationship continues to pose its own challenge to the auditor’s
independence.
The subject of auditors providing consulting services to their clients is
the most sensitive when the focus is tax services. Neither SEC nor PCAOB
regulations prevent auditors from providing significant tax consulting
services to their audit clients. The sensitivities of this consulting
relationship arise on two fronts. First, tax consulting is a significant
revenue source for accounting firms with much of that being derived
from their audit clients. This consulting service matters a lot to accounting firms. Secondly, there is ample reason to believe that tax services pose
a serious threat of compromising the auditor’s independence.83 Although
broad SEC requirements warn that auditors are not independent when
attesting on their own work,84 this is a red light easily run by the
accountants in the context of tax advice provided to their audit clients.
The threat to their independence is particularly significant when
accounting firms market ‘off-the-rack’ tax shelter products to their audit
clients and subsequently attest that, among other items, the financial
statements fairly present the client’s tax expenses and liabilities. As a
recent congressional study (US Senate 2003: 15–16) of the US tax shelter
industry reported,
KPMG’s decision to market tax products to its own audit clients . . . created a
conflict of interest. . . [because] the KPMG auditor reviewing the client’s financial statements is required, as part of that review, to examine the client’s tax
return and its use of unusual tax strategies. In such situations, KPMG is, in
effect, auditing its own work.

To what extent members of the audit committee have changed their
behaviour in the post-Enron era, or in the shadow of the new
requirements ushered in by Sarbanes-Oxley, remains to be seen. As seen
83 Mr Michael Hamersley, a senior audit manager of KPMG LLP, testified before the US
Senate Finance Committee that he was placed on administrative leave when he refused to
‘sign off’ on questionable tax transactions engineered by KPMG’s tax consultants. See
Bryan-Low (2003c). At that hearing, PCAOB Board Chair, William McDonough, testified that
the PCAOB was examining whether the provision of tax services to audit clients
compromised the accountant’s independence and whether to restrict the tax services an
auditor could provide clients (ibid.).
84 SEC (2000) identifies the following four overarching principles to guide determinations
of whether an auditor is independent: has the client relationship (a) created a mutual or
conflicting interest; (b) call for the accountant to audit its own work; (c) result in the
accountant acting as a manager or employee of the client; or (d) place the accountant in an
advocacy position for the client?
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earlier, the relative percentage of the total revenues auditors garner from
their audit clients from consulting has declined in the last few years.
However, the decline may not be as great as it first appears. First, as
discussed below, the disclosure requirements for non-audit fees became
more relaxed in 2003 than they were in 2002, thereby permitting many
former non-audit services to be now classified as audit or audit-related
services. Secondly, the decline may be a change in scale and not a
substantive change in how auditors view their relationship to the audit
committee or the firm’s shareholders. We might find some solace in the
continuing increase in the number of earnings restatements: 2002 marked
a record number of earnings restatements, with the number of
restatements that year reaching 330, a 22 per cent increase over those for
the preceding year (Huron Consulting Group 2003)85 and only a slight
decline to 323 for 2003, with a 28 per cent increase in 2004 to 414 reported
restatements (ibid. 2005).86 The restatements may well portend both
greater diligence on the part of the auditors as well as a stiffening of their
resolve.87 Each, of course, would be hopeful signs of an improved
financial reporting culture.
Post-Enron, the metrics for financial reporting have been strengthened
on many fronts. As is now well understood, Enron concealed significant
liabilities by its deft and sometimes impermissible treatment of
transactions carried out by special purpose entities (SPEs). To address
these abuses, the Financial Accounting Standards Board in 2003 issued its
interpretation No. 46 ‘Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities’ (FIN
46). The short history of FIN 46 suggests that the reporting culture on this
matter remains as disturbing as it was in Enron. One study of more than
500 large companies’ financial reports found substantial evidence of
non-compliance with the heightened disclosures called for by FIN 46 or a
demonstrative lack of transparency in the reporting of their financial

85 Surprisingly, the number of companies with over $1 billion in revenues nearly doubled
over the number in 2001 (ibid.).
86 Huron argues the rise in restatements for 2004 is likely due to the intense focus
by reporting companies and their auditors on the registrant’s internal controls as a
result of complying with the new internal control reporting requirements mandated by §
404 of Sarbanes Oxley; Huron Consulting Group (2004: 4). Accounting restatements
carry their own pain for investors. Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) study 403
restatements between 1995–9 and find an average negative return of 9% in the two days
following the announcement with even greater reaction for restatements involving fraud. A
GAO study (2002: 24–26) of 689 earnings restatements between 1 January 1997 and 26 March
2002 found an average three-day market decline following the announcement of 10% which
translates to an average $139 million decline for each of the firms or $95.6 billion for all 689
firms.
87 Professor Bratton (2003b: 487) provides the most acute description of the source of
restatements: the restatements follow less from regulatory arbitrage than from strategic
noncompliance—action under an interpretation of the law in conflict with the stated
interpretation of the regulator.
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relationship with their SPEs.88 This should not surprise us since sitting
CFOs continue to be under substantial pressure to meet analysts’
expectations and report favorably on the firm’s stewards, even if this
masks the true financial position of the firm. The study’s data
complements the results of a recent survey of portfolio and fund
managers. The survey asked the money managers to rate financial
reporting by public companies. They gave financial reporting a weak C+
(AIMR 2003: 1). The survey also identified information about off-balance
sheet assets and liabilities as their highest valued disclosure item (ibid.: 3).
The survey appears to reflect the neglect that FIN 46 has suffered in the
executive suites of CFOs.
One area showing no change is that of the politics of accounting and
particularly the eagerness with which CEOs and CFOs are willing to
exercise their considerable political muscle to shape their disclosure
obligations. A key provision of Sarbanes-Oxley seeks to assure that the
FASB is independent of the auditor’s clients.89 The Act therefore
mandates that no standard-setter can be an authoritative source for
accounting standards used in SEC filings unless its funding was derived
from fees imposed by the SEC on its registrants.90 This unquestionably is
the most important development in the history of accounting
standard-setting. The obvious hope of this provision is that the FASB’s
agenda or its pronouncements would no longer be influenced by its
funding sources as had occurred in the past when the FASB received its
funding from a trust that appointed its members to raise funding largely
from the accounting profession. Earlier, these purse strings were held by
the accounting firms and were the conduit through which their audit
clients influenced the FASB’s agenda as well as the content of audit
standards. But influence from the regulated, certainly at the national
level, can come from many levels. Thus, consider the on-going
developments in the Congress.
The FASB has announced its intent to adopt a standard requiring the
expensing of stock options.91 Currently, the grant of a stock option is
reported only in the footnotes of a firm’s financial statements, where
disclosure of the estimate value of the option to its recipient is disclosed.
The option’s value to its recipient is, on the other hand, a cost to the
company since this reflects lost opportunity to the company to sell the
option to a third party. The FASB has announced that it believes stock
88 See Glass, Lewis & Co. (2003a)(finding that some companies are keeping the financial
items for which they are responsible off their balance sheets via SPEs through liberal
interpretation of FIN 46).
89 See generally Cox (2003).
90 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act 15 U.S.C. § 7218(b)(1)(iii).
91 See FASB (2004): options issued by a company are to be reflected at their fair value on its
financial statements.
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options should be reflected as a charge, i.e., expense, on the company’s
financials statements. This essentially moves the estimated expense to a
more prominent position; the estimates that are currently buried among
the firm’s financial statements under the standard proposed by the FASB
will appear as an expense within the body of the firm’s income statement
thereby reducing the firm’s reported net income for that fiscal period.92 In
adopting this new position, the FASB would be following the position
recently taken by the International Accountings Standards Board which
recently called for the expensing of stock options.93
Reflecting the view that an independent standard-setter is not in
everyone’s interest, a large group of executives (a significant portion
being from the high tech industry)94 have mobilized their financial
muscle to secure passage—by nearly a three to one margin—in the US
House of Representatives of HR 3574, ‘The Stock Option Accounting
Reform Act.’ In broad overview, HR 3574 overrides any pronouncement
that may be adopted by the FASB with respect to stock options that
would require the expensing of stock options except with respect to the
CEO and the next four most highly compensated executives. Thus, no
expensing would be reported for options given to other employees (i.e.,
not the five most senior). Importantly, the magnitude of the amount to be
reflected as an expense reduced by, among other provisions of the bill, by
assuming no volatility in the stock’s price. Moreover, small public
companies need not expense their options and those that have recently
become public enjoy a three-year grace period in reporting the costs of
their executives’ options. Independent of the social welfare of expensing
or not expensing stock options, HR 3574, and more particularly the large
congressional support it has gathered (including one of its sponsors,
Congressman Oxley himself), raises an even larger issue: the significant
compromise to the independence and authority of the FASB should HR
3574 be enacted appears beyond peradventure. The recent experience
92 The issues that surround this debate are nicely summarized in a letter (Ciesielski 2004)
recently directed to the sponsors of H.R. 3574, discussed later in the text: ‘The issue of
recognizing option compensation expense has been cloaked in many false garbs; options can’t
be valued properly, jobs will be lost to foreign countries, the stock market will fall if the
expense is recognized. At the end of the day, it all comes down to executive compensation
that’s been shielded from investors’ view. You manage what you measure: the stock
compensation of the past decade has been not measured well, nor managed well (if at all, in
some cases). Putting an expense figure into the income statement for stock compensation
enables the markets to monitor the way shareholders’ funds are being employed or wasted –
not the sort of relevant information that managements would like to see shared freely. You can
dress it up in all kinds of arguments about harm to various constituencies, but the bottom line
is management resistance to any kind of effective governance by the markets when it comes to
compensation.’
93 See IASB (2004): the fair value of securities granted to employees must be reported as an
expense reflecting the value of the securities.
94 Incidentally, the industry group supporting HR 3574 is the same industry group who
provide the momentum to pass the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
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with HR 3574 reflects that Sarbanes-Oxley’s call for independent funding
of the financial reporting standard-setter has not removed the FASB from
the political pressures that audit clients can bring to bear on the
standard-setting process. To be sure, one positive feature of SarbanesOxley is it has made those pressures more visible. Those exercising
influence over financial reporting standards must now do so in a more
open setting than heretofore. Nonetheless, the message is the same,
namely that significant rents can be collected by politicians willing to
support the reporting standards desired by their constituents. The advent
of HR 3574, and particularly the executives that support it, is consistent
with the fear that when it comes to financial reporting too many
executives do not see independence as a desideratum.95
Sadly, it appears that Congress is not the lone rent seeker with respect
to reporting issues post-Sarbanes-Oxley. The SEC appears also to be
influenced by the desires of those it regulates. In January 2003, the SEC
amended its disclosure requirements for registrants to disclose (either in
the firm’s proxy statement or its annual reporting form) the professional
fees paid their independent accountants.96 The 2003 amendments
expanded the disclosure categories from three to four categories—(1)
audit fees; (2) audit related fees; (3) tax fees; and (4) all other fees—and
required disclosure for each of the two most recent fiscal years not just the
most recent fiscal year as had been the requirement per its first regulatory
foray into this area in 2000.97 At first blush this appears to be very
pro-regulatory since the provisions appear to call for more refined
disclosure of the sources of fees paid to a company’s auditor. However,
several questionable features appear within the details of the 2003
amendments. First, the amendments expanded the definition of items
included within ‘audit fees,’ so that the audit fee rubric thereafter will
include all fees relevant to the accountant’s discharging their responsibilities pursuant to ‘generally accepted auditing standards.’ This seems
tame enough until one realizes that what is included is not just the fees
that are ‘billed … for the audit’ but also includes ‘services that are
normally provided by the accountant in connection with statutory or
regulatory filings or engagements.’98
95 Importantly for the position of this chapter, the Big Four accounting firms oppose the
legislation and, thus, do not align themselves with many of their clients in opposing the
changes the FASB proposes. See Nally et al. 2004.
96 See SEC (2003).
97 See 15 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 Item 9 (2003).
98 See SEC (2003: note 233): ‘[W]e are expanding the types of fees that should be included in
this category to include fees for services that normally would be provided by the accountant
in connection with statutory or regulatory filings or engagements. In addition to including
fees for services necessary to perform an audit or review in accordance with GAAS, this
category also may include services that generally only the independent accountant
reasonably can provide, such as comfort letters, statutory audits, attest services, consents and
assistance with and review of documents filed with the Commission.’
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The breadth of this is appreciated when compared with the disclosure
requirements that preceded the 2003 amendments; between 2000 and
early 2003 the audit fee category included only:
aggregate fees billed for professional services rendered for the audit of the
registrant’s annual financial statements … and reviews of the financial statements included in the registrant’s quarterly reports filed with the SEC.99

standard settThe 2003 amendments broadened the audit fee category
to include comfort letters and consents and assistance with and reviews
of documents filed with the SEC.100
Secondly, the 2003 amendment adds a new category, ‘audit-related
fees’ that includes professional charges for professional assurances and
related services provided by the auditor that traditionally have been
carried out by the auditor such as employee benefit plan audits, due
diligence related to acquisitions, accounting consultations, audits in
connection with acquisitions, internal control reviews, attest services that
are not required by statute or regulation, and consultation concerning
financial accounting and reporting standards. Prior to the 2003
amendments these charges were set forth under the ‘all other fees’
rubric.101 Thus, the 2003 amendments usher in two deregulatory changes
for disclosing the relationship the auditor has with its client. First, it
expands the ‘audit fees’ category to include services that are not
specifically part of the audit and, secondly, it creates a mongrel category,
‘audit-related fees’: so that it significantly reduces the number of
fees swept into the ‘all-other-fees’ category. In combination, these
changes have provided an opening for important circumvention of
Sarbanes-Oxley’s pre-approval requirements for non-audit services. With
respect to this fear, consider the reaction of a Big Four accounting firm
following the 2003 amendments. Ernst & Young’s manual instructs its
audit clients that for items falling within either the audit or audit-related:
a minimal level of consideration [by the client’s audit committee] relating to
pre-approval [is required] because they have not been thought to raise independence concerns’.

Ernst & Young further opines for its clients that audit-related services
that ‘generally improve audit quality and do not impair independence’
and are,

See 15 C.F.R. § 240.14a-10–101 (2002).
See block quote above, note [ ].
101 See 15 C.F.R. § 240.14a-10–101 (2002).
99

100
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by definition not the types of ‘consulting services’ that have given rise to concern about non-audit services in recent years.102

We might well question why there should be concern that some of
professional fees will be labeled outside the all-other-fees category.
Consider the implications of characterizing as ‘audit-related fees’ due
diligence services performed by an auditor in connection with its
acquisition of another company. For example, as a step toward approving
its acquisition of another company, the client asks its auditor to carry out
a due diligence review of the target firm. The auditor’s review includes
an evaluation of the worth of that firm’s assets and the existence, quantity
and quality of its earnings and cash flow. Post-acquisition, the same
auditor might—in connection to its annual audit—discover that
misjudgments or other errors were committed in its earlier due diligence
investigation so that absent correction, the financial performance or
position of the client will be materially misstated. The purpose of the
pre-approval procedures for non-audit services is to allow the audit
committee members to assess this risk independently. The purpose of
highlighting the cost of these services in the firm’s proxy statement or
Form 10-K is both to reinforce the seriousness of the audit committee’s
pre-approval and to alert investors to risks of their auditors carrying out a
task that might later pose a conflict of interest that adversely impacts the
quality of the company’s financial reports. By sweeping such due
diligence reviews within the more neutral ‘audit-related fees’ without
separately disclosing the function for which the fees were paid, as would
be required for material items within the ‘all-other-fees’ category, the
objectives of both pre-approval and disclosure are weakened.
It remains early in the life of Sarbanes-Oxley and today’s reconstituted
audit committees. Sarbanes-Oxley and the heightened listing
requirements are unquestionably steps that have improved the financial
reporting process by strengthening the independence of the auditor.103
The evidence gathered in Part VI at least raises serious questions whether
the reforms have gone far enough. The next section explores what more
needs to be done.

See Consumer Federation of America (2003).
Unfortunately, little attention has been focused on whether strong social and
psychological forces may prevent the audit committee from rising to the level of detached
independence envisioned in today’s reforms. For a review of many of these forces and
skepticism that the audit committee will fulfill the reforms’ objectives, see Beecher-Monas
(2003).
102
103
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V I I . S O M E S T E P S TO WA R D I M P R O V I N G T H E O L I GO P O L I S T A S
A GAT E K E E P E R

Part of the solution to improving the trustworthiness of financial
reporting is reducing the avenues the accountant can pursue to cheat on
the standards otherwise pursued by the accounting industry. Herein is
the irony posed by the accounting profession as an oligopoly. In the more
typical situation, competition within an oligopoly manifests itself by
the cheater reducing its price or providing a superior service for the
same price charged by its competitors. The evidence gathered in Part VI
suggests that members of the accounting profession could not engage in
product quality competition because of difficulties of their client’s
determining ex ante differences in the quality of services provided or
because some members of the industry enjoyed an unerodable advantage
in terms of expertise and reputation for carrying out audits within certain
broad industry classifications. Their real competition was in the more
competitive environment of consulting services where they faced each
other as well as many non-accounting vendors of consulting services.
Here the auditor enjoyed—and could well have exploited—a competitive
edge that its consulting competitors could not rival: a pre-existing
relationship with the client that afforded it an exploitable commercial
advantage because its familiarity with the client’s business and potential
compromising of its independence in evaluating the quality of the client’s
financial reporting.
Because of the difficulty of assessing just how significant the
information advantage the auditor enjoyed with respect to a consulting
project offered by its client, or even the extent it could leverage
compromises to its independence so as to reap consulting revenues, it
was not possible for competing audit firms to engage in any behaviour
except to mimic with their own clients the practices of their competitors.
By doing so it did not behove any industry member to pursue a course
different from the other big accounting firms and abstain from becoming
a consultant to its audit clients.
There is reason to believe that auditing will now play a more
important role in revenue growth of the accounting industry in the
future. This is because many of the services once provided by the
independent accountant are now proscribed by Sarbanes-Oxley, and all
but one of the Big Four firms having divested certain features of their
consulting services falling within these proscribed categories. The
accountants still carry out a wide variety of services that swell their
non-audit-related fees to levels greatly in excess of those falling within
either the current ‘audit’ and ‘audit-related’ categories. Moreover,
Sarbanes-Oxley has added a number of significant features to financial
reporting so that audit responsibilities and their allied tasks have greatly
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expanded. With these rising costs and reduced flexibility to trade off
audit quality for consulting, it is propitious to consider whether the cartel
problem can be a virtue in the context of financial reporting.
Recall the dilemma each cartel member faces when it learns that a rival
is cheating. A key feature to the cartel responding to a cheater is accurate
information regarding deviance by a member of the oligopoly. Here we
might consider whether the trustworthiness of financial reporting is
advanced with more or less information respecting the cost of the audit
provided by the auditor. Under the classic formulation, Auditor A who
learns that its rival, Auditor B, is selling a product to a client for less than
the going price can discipline Auditor B by, for example, matching the
price or taking some disciplinary step. As seen earlier, this response is not
likely in the case of audit services due to the lack of uniformity of the
service offered, the competitive advantage of a pre-existing knowledge of
the audit client, and expertise that appears imbedded within some
accounting firms with respect to certain important industries.
The solution may be to impose discipline outside the cartel, namely
market forces related to the pricing of the audit client’s securities.
Assuming that markets are sensitive to relationships that might
compromise the accountant’s independence, enhanced disclosure of
those relationships likely will have positive social welfare implications.
Comparing the cost of audits with the overall revenues garnered by the
accountant from its audit client would better appraise investors and the
audit committee of the risks non-audit service revenue poses to the
independence of the attest function. This benefit itself should justify
returning to the pre-2003 disclosure guidelines regarding disclosure of
the composition of the auditor’s income from its audit client.
A further weakening of the bond that non-audit services provide to
management is to place the award, renewal, or discontinuation of
material non-audit services to a reporting company’s auditor on the same
level as terminating its accountant. If the termination of the auditor as
auditor and the termination or engagement of the auditor as consultant
were each subject of being reported on Form 8-K it would remove some
of the differential advantages non-audit services confers on managers
vis-a-vis audit services in its bargaining with the accountants. Because of
the additional friction this would pose to public companies, it may well
open the consulting opportunities to other accounting firms. This could
be the means for the issuer to gain confidence in another accounting firm
so that changing accounting firms would be a less daunting task. This
could also change the perspective of the company’s current auditor so
that it may cease viewing its relationship as a perpetuity so that it would
have increased concern for its reputation and less for the relationship
itself. Audit committees, as seen earlier, have sole responsibility for
retention and renewal of the outside accountant. The audit committee is

The Oligopolistic Gatekeeper: The US Accounting Profession

307

also charged with evaluating the inputs that produced the financial
reports. Sarbanes-Oxley and the listing requirements of the NYSE and
Nasdaq in combination seek to mandate a dialogue between the
accountant and the committee’s members for the purpose of assuring that
the audit committee is fully engaged in carrying out this process. For
example, the accountant is required to identify the critical accounting
estimates and choices used in preparing the financial statements. A
significant gap in the audit committee’s engagement with the accountant
is a standard by which they must measure their compliance with
Sarbanes-Oxley and the firm’s listing organization. Certainly, more
should be required of the committee members than to receive a recitation
of the critical accounting choices and estimates. By so limiting the
obligations any hoped-for deliberations and conversation with the
auditor are vacuous. For the CEO and CFO, the law now demands that
they certify in reports filed with the SEC that the financial statements
fairly present the firm’s financial position and performance. This goes to
the heart of financial reporting: the financial statements should reflect the
economic realities and achievements of the firm.104
Given the temptations that some executives face, one might be cynical
regarding the significance executive certifications will be in deterring
rogue executives from cooking the books. This explains, in part, the
prominent role cast for the audit committee by contemporary corporate
governance requirements. A good audit committee will not be satisfied
only with a recitation of just what were the critical accounting judgments
and estimates. The ‘why’ and the ‘effects’ of those judgments will be
examined by its members. Such inquiry should be a requirement for all
audit committees of reporting companies who should be tasked to satisfy
themselves that the choices and judgments made as identified by the
auditor result in combination to a fair presentation of the firm’s financial
performance and position. With this requirement being added to the
SEC’s regulations, it provides the litmus for the committee members’
understanding why they are to inquire as to the firm’s critical accounting
estimates and judgments. Moreover, it provides a more acute basis for the
committee to assess the independence of the auditor. The PCAOB can
complete the circle by requiring that part of the auditor’s attest function
be a separate report that explains why the critical accounting choices and
estimates that have been made in preparing the financial statements
‘fairly present’ the company’s financial performance and position.105
104 The full significance of this is reflected in the classic case, United States v Simon, 425 F.2d
796 (2d Cir. 1969), which holds that mere compliance with generally accepted auditing
standards and generally accepted accounting principles do not alone assure that the financial
statements are not materially misleading.
105 This idea was first advanced by Professor Elliot Weiss (2003: 512–14) and calls upon the
auditor to (1) identify the critical accounting judgments; (2) describe the factors the auditor
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Related to the auditor’s independence is the role tax services provided
by the auditor might have in compromising the accountant’s
independence. Recall that fees paid to the auditor for tax services are now
separately reported. These fees are significant and continue to be a source
of concern both because of their size as well as that they may relate to
advice provided on transactions that are also the focus of the attest
function.106 The SEC has broadly proscribed auditors providing
consulting services on transactions which auditors will later have to
review in discharging a statutory audit. There continues to be concern
that this standard is too general so that auditors may turn a blind eye to
the possibility that their audit of a transaction is compromised by their
earlier providing tax advice for that transaction.107 While one response is
a bar to accounting firms providing tax consulting to their audit clients,
this may not be politically possible.108
An intermediate solution is to require the accountant to file a report as
part of the registrant’s proxy statement or annual report describing the
five largest (in terms of revenues) tax consulting items provided the audit
client and why its audit was not compromised by it having provided such
advice. There would be a requirement that the audit committee
acknowledge that it had received the report and had reviewed the report
with the auditor. In combination, this would provide some useful
oversight and caution to the accountant and its client in undertaking this
side relationship.
It should be noted that none of the above suggested approaches will
induce competitive responses from other members of the accounting
industry. They rely upon strengthening the independent voices within the
corporation, its audit committee, and facilitating market responses that
can discipline issuers by raising their cost of capital. With the product of
the accounting industry being a service tailored to the special systems
and culture of the client, price competition and quality competition are
less visible components. Moreover, the cartel problem may have the
considered in making its assessment of those accounting judgments; and (3) describe how the
financial statements are sensitive to those judgments. Forty years ago, then Big Eight firm
Arthur Andersen & Co. sought to decouple the fair presentation standard from the
requirement that the financial statements be prepared in conformity with GAAP; this change
would have permitted the firm to certify financial statements not prepared in accordance with
GAAP when the auditor believed GAAP did not fairly present the firm’s financial
performance or position (Zeff 1992).
106 Fees paid for tax work in 2003 by Fortune 500 firms represented 43% of audit fees (Glass
Lewis & Co. 2003b).
107 See e.g., Public Oversight Board (2004b): advising PCAOB of the need to develop
rigorous standards addressing conflicts of interest that can be posed by tax services provided
to audit clients.
108 See Public Oversight Board (2004c): not preventing the auditor from carrying on
substantial tax services for its clients with the major restriction being that it not promote to its
clients questionable tax shelters or be rewarded by fees contingent on an outcome, such as
favorable treatment by the IRS [?].
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perverse effect of causing competitive responses that will lower the
quality of the audit or, weaken auditor independence. If either of these
were the competitive response then competition would be harmful.
Nevertheless, disclosure of the presence or absence of questionable
relationships and steps to assure independence of its audit staff may have
favorable reputation effects for the practicing firm. To this end, enhanced
disclosure can facilitate competition on this basis which would be a
positive development. With truly independent and informed audit
committees it might be possible for meaningful competition on the
quality of services to occur. Certainly, a committee charged with
responsibility for overseeing the quality of a firm’s financial reporting
would not be immune to competing presentations.
The above are but small steps that may well improve the overall
quality of financial statements. Even more profound steps in improving
the auditor’s independence and the concomitant quality of financial
reporting would occur if public companies were also required to rotate
auditing firms periodically, for example every seven years, and by
imposing an absolute bar to non-audit services. Opponents to mandatory
rotation assert that this would visit unnecessarily high expenses on
reporting companies.109 A new audit team would face a steep learning
curve that could only be surmounted by greater staffing and higher costs
than would have been required if the audit were carried out by the
auditing firm with a historical relationship with the client. This
undoubtedly is true. But these concerns may well be overstated. In 2003
alone, approximately 900 companies engaged new auditors and did so as
a matter of choice.110 For the vast number of these changes, no reason was
stated. With there being approximately 17,000 reporting companies, this
reflects not less than 5 per cent of those companies changing auditors
every year. A mandatory requirement of rotation every seventh year
would call for this number to be tripled. We might ask whether such a
requirement is such a significant change in scale. Although the number
making changes slightly exceeds 5 per cent of all reporting companies, it
suggests that a large number of firms can change auditors with no
apparent harm to investors. It should be noted that if all firms were
required to rotate auditors every ten years that the number of changes in
any single year would be roughly double the number that occurred in
2003. Such rotation can be expected to lead to much less concentration
within industries. The dominant position that individual Big Four firms
109 GAO (2004) concludes that prudent course is to monitor and evaluate the effects of
Sarbanes-Oxley and other reform efforts on the financial reporting process before incurring
the costs and related uncertainties related to mandatory rotation of audit firms.
110 See Glass, Lewis & Co. (2004). No reason was given for making the change of auditors for
two-thirds of the companies. By mid-summer of 2004, the number of public companies
changing auditors had already reached the level of 2003 (i.e., 900 companies) (Plitch and Wei
2004).

310

James D Cox

hold with respect to certain industries would be challenged by other
firms realizing that a forced change in auditors provides each with the
potential to obtain the business that historically belonged to another firm.
This would cause rivals to raid each other’s stable of audit partners with
the desired experience so as to develop the necessary expertise and
critical mass to be a credible competitor.
Removing non-audit revenues from the auditors income from their
audit clients would have the salutary effect of forcing auditors to compete
on price and quality of their audit services. Competition on quality will
be possible by publicly available information that arises from the
PCAOB’s frequent inspection reports. Audit committees should become
students of the results of PCAOB reports, certainly any that are focused
on their auditor. Any disclosed systemic weaknesses in the quality of the
firm’s auditor is a clarion call for the audit committee to assure itself that
those weaknesses do not recur with the audit being performed for it. If all
accounting firms earn equally qualified or even weak reports, the audit
committee’s response is not to hide in the complacent bliss that one
cannot do better. The correct response is to extract assurances from its
auditor that those found weaknesses will not occur with its audit. These
foci will introduce competition among accounting firms based on quality
and quality assurances, a most healthy and long overdue development.

V I I I . CO N CL U S I O N

The recent financial and accounting scandals reflect that the accounting
industry has performed badly. Not all of its problems are due to its
oligopolistic structure. However, its oligopolistic structure facilitated
consciously parallel action on the part of large accounting firms that
caused each to pursue a strategy of transforming itself into a business
that also provided auditing services. True reform of the industry requires
sensitivity to how its concentration contributed to its ills. This chapter has
set forth both an explanation of the cause and the cures for what ails this
gatekeeper.
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